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ABSTRACT
Can the Imagination View of Dreaming Resolve the
Awake-Dreaming Indistinguishability Problem?
by
MOK Ka Yan
Master of Philosophy

In his Meditations On First Philosophy, Descartes (1641/1911) points out the awakedreaming indistinguishability problem, which calls into question the reliability of our
knowledge about the external world. The argument can be understood as follows:
P1) Nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in X when she
is actually in Y.
P2) A person can know that she is in Y only if there is something to rule out her being
duped into believing she is in X when she is actually in Y.
C) Hence, the subject cannot know that she is in Y.
The problem can be interpreted in the form of A1 where X represents a dream state
and Y represents an awake state. It can also be interpreted in the form of A2 where X
represents an awake state and Y represents a dream state. I define the problem in the
form of A1(X: a dream state; Y: an awake state) and A2(X: an awake state; Y: a dream
state). The problem also involves an epistemological aspect and a phenomenological
aspect. The epistemological aspect concerns the question of whether dream states and
awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable. If so, the problem would be
irresolvable in principle and result in a great epistemic threat. The phenomenological
aspect concerns how the experience appears to the subject and affects the judgment
she makes about her current state. In order to fully resolve the problem, as I will argue,
we need to show that both A1 and A2 are unsound and resolve both aspects of the
problem.
McGinn (2004), Ichikawa (2008, 2009), and Sosa (2005) try to resolve the awakedreaming indistinguishability problem by defending (different versions of) the
imagination view of dreaming. Among the three, Ichikawa holds the strongest version,
where he denies that percepts and beliefs occur in dreams; McGinn denies percepts
occur in dreams while Sosa denies beliefs occur in dreams. I argue that their arguments,
namely drawing a sharp distinction between percepts and images along with denying
beliefs occur in dreams, are misguided. They fail to resolve any form or any aspect of

the indistinguishability problem. My goal of this research is to reinvigorate the
imagination view of dreaming. Instead of holding a sharp distinction between percepts
and images along with denying belief occur in dreams, I attempt to bridge the gap
between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming to defend this view. I contend that the
imagination view of dreaming, upon modification, can resolve the problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Dreaming and dreams have been topics of philosophical inquiry since ancient times.
Dreams are usually postulated as posing an epistemic threat to the reliability of
perceptual knowledge. This is prominent in Descartes’s argument: I cannot rule out
the possibility that I am dreaming now. Senses can be deceptive. Therefore, I should
not trust my senses. How can dreams, which occur during sleep, threaten the reliability
of perceptual knowledge which can only be acquired in awake states? Dreams are said
to have subjectively indistinguishable characters from those of awake states, as
Descartes (1641/1911) suggests, “there are no certain indications by which we may
clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep” (p.7). This provokes an epistemological
inquiry over the reliability of perceptual knowledge. It also leads to a
phenomenological study of the nature of dream states. Descartes attempts to dispel the
epistemic threat in the Sixth Meditation by arguing that there are essential differences
between dream states and awake states and we can distinguish between them. Senses
are not deceptive and we can trust them. This move aims at restoring the general
reliability of perceptual knowledge. However, if there are essential differences
between awake states and dream states, we should be able to distinguish between them
and tell which state we are currently in. If we cannot tell we are in a dream state, it can
lead us back to the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. This is a phenomenal
threat brought by the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming where the subject is unaware
of the fact that she is in a dream state and mistakenly believes she is in an awake state.
If such unawareness problem is not tackled properly, the epistemic threat will still
persist.

Recently the focus on the study of dreaming has shifted from the epistemological
aspect to the phenomenological aspect, namely what the nature of the dream
1

experience is and how it is related to the study of consciousness. These two aspects are
interrelated. The unawareness problem in the dream state and the limited control over
the dream content cast doubt on the reliability of introspective knowledge (whether I
know my current state) and in turn on the reliability of perceptual knowledge (whether
I know I am being awake and having percepts). Recently the imagination view of
dreaming has emerged, in an attempt to dispel the epistemic worries brought by
dreaming. In this thesis, I analyze the arguments of three contemporary philosophers
defending the imagination view of dreaming. They are Colin McGinn, Jonathan
Ichikawa and Ernest Sosa. I argue that their approaches fail to dispel the epistemic
threat posed by the dreaming phenomenon. I attempt to modify the imagination view
of dreaming so as to resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.

The structure of this thesis is as follows:
In chapter one, I delineate the form of the awake-dreaming indistinguishability
problem and briefly outline how the problem can be resolved.
In chapter two, I evaluate the arguments of McGinn, Ichikawa, and Sosa to elucidate
why their arguments fail to resolve the problem. I divide this chapter into two parts,
each focusing on one of their main approaches: A) the sharp distinction between
percepts and images, and B) the denial of belief in dreams. In part A), I argue that the
sharp distinction arguments are misguided and do not help resolve the problem. Some
even worsen the problem. Basically, their arguments are misguided in two ways: 1.
taking hallucinations to be percepts, which poses a further threat to the reliability of
perceptual knowledge, and 2. involving what I call “an awake-state stereotyped
conception of imaginings” as being higher-order (with the subject’s awareness of the
fact that she is in an imagining state), which is an ad hoc approach and fails to explain
2

non-lucid dreaming. In part B), I argue that how Ichikawa and Sosa deny that dream
beliefs are beliefs is not legitimate. They stick to what I call “an awake-state
stereotyped conception of belief” as being perceptual and functional. This limits the
scope of belief, which hinders a fair study of dream beliefs and a more thorough
examination of belief. Moreover, such an approach is ad hoc and does not resolve the
awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.
In chapter three, I attempt to provide a modified version of the imagination view of
dreaming to resolve the problem. I argue that awake states and dream states are not
fundamentally indistinguishable. This dispels the pressing epistemic threat where the
subject is doomed not to be able to distinguish between the two and tell which state
they are currently in on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. Finally, I
attempt to dispel the phenomenal threat of dreaming concerning the unawareness
problem in the dream state by bridging the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid
dreaming: they fall on a continuum rather than being dichotomously distinct. Moreover,
the trainability of lucid dreaming further undermines the phenomenal threat posed by
dreaming. I round up the thesis by briefly suggesting some insight brought by my
studies and possible future research.

3

CHAPTER 1: The Awake-Dreaming Indistinguishability Problem
In the First Meditation, Descartes (1641/1911) points out the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem, which calls into question the reliability of our knowledge
about the external world. The argument can be understood as follows:

P1) Nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in X when she
is actually in Y.
P2) A person can know she is in Y only if there is something to rule out her being
duped into believing she is in X when she is actually in Y.
C) Hence, the subject cannot know she is in Y.

In the philosophy literature, it is unclear in what form the problem is illustrated
exactly.1 The problem can be interpreted in the form of A1 where X represents a dream
state and Y represents an awake state. It can also be interpreted in the form of A2 where
X represents an awake state and Y represents a dream state. As I will show, different
interpretations can result in different consequences. It is important to define the
problem, before one attempts to resolve it. I define the problem in the form of A1(X:
a dream state; Y: an awake state) and A2(X: an awake state; Y: a dream state). The
problem also involves an epistemological aspect and a phenomenological aspect. The
epistemological aspect concerns the question of whether dream states and awake states
are fundamentally indistinguishable.2 The phenomenological aspect concerns how the

Even Descartes (1641/1911), the one who points out the problem, does not clearly delineate in what
form of the argument the problem lies. McGinn (2004), Ichikawa (2009), and Sosa (2005) are along the
same line. They just roughly take the problem to be the subject being unable to distinguish between
dream states and awake states, whether the subject is actually in a dream state or an awake state is not
addressed.
2
This means these two kinds of states are indistinguishable to the subject by their very nature: there is
no difference between them that can be spotted by the subject, with the assumption that the subject is
rational and can make a judgment about her current state on a well-justified basis from the experience.
4
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experience appears to the subject and affects the judgment she makes about her current
state. Two important questions arising from the phenomenological aspect of the
problem are what makes a correct judgment and what makes a faulty judgment. If
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, it is impossible for
the subject to make a correct judgment about her current state on a well-justified basis
from the experiential evidence available. P1 of A1, on the condition that the subject
who is rational should be able to spot the difference between dream states and awake
states (if there is any that can be spotted) and tell their current state, if true, shows
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, which results in a
great epistemic threat: it is impossible for the subject to distinguish between dream
states and awake states. The awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem will be
irresolvable in principle. The whole knowledge system (about the external world) may
collapse as a result.

In order to avoid such a pessimistic view and save our knowledge system, Descartes
tries to resolve the problem in the Sixth Meditation, where he claims that we can
discern a key difference between these two kinds of states. I argue that such a claim is
only the first step to addressing, but cannot fully resolve, the problem. That claim can
be used to show that P1 of A1 is false and thus A1 collapses.3 It means there is at least
one difference between dream states and awake states that the subject can spot and
differentiate between the two kinds of states. Then dream states and awake states are
not fundamentally indistinguishable and the subject should be able to tell she is in an
awake state when she actually is and at the same time, she should also be able to tell

There are two conditions needed to show P1 of A1 is false: 1. there is at least one difference between
dream states and awake states, and 2. the subject is rational (who can spot the differences and tell he is
in an awake state on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence).
5
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she is in a dream state when she actually is. However, there is non-lucid dreaming
where the subject cannot tell she is in a dream state when she actually is. A2 still stands
and the epistemic threat still persists. In order to fully resolve the problem, we need to
show A2 is unsound and resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem, namely
to bridge the gap between non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming. We need to address
different orders of the awareness of the subject in dreaming: in lucid dreaming, the
subject possesses a higher-order awareness and she can tell she is dreaming (rather
than being awake); in non-lucid dreaming, the subject possesses a lower-order
awareness and she cannot tell she is dreaming (and falsely believes she is being awake).
If the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming is not bridged appropriately,
the phenomenal threat remains in principle and the problem persists. In order to fully
resolve the problem, we need to collapse both A1 and A2, and resolve both the
epistemological and the phenomenological aspects of the problem.

A1 & The Epistemological Aspect of the Problem
In the First Meditation, Descartes (1641/1911) writes,

“How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this
particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying
undressed in bed……I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which
we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep…”
(p. 7)
The way he illustrates the problem “distinguish wakefulness from sleep” targets A1.

Descartes does not mention the issue of rationality of the subject. This is important
6

since it can lead to different interpretations of the problem. If a and b are subjectively
indistinguishable, it means the subject cannot tell the difference between a and b. This
claim does not entail that the subject is rational.4 Different interpretations are possible.
One possible interpretation is that the subject is irrational. Let us call this case 1. In
this case, even if there are obvious differences between a and b (which rational beings
are supposed to be able to tell), he is still unable to tell. Another interpretation is that
the subject is rational. Let us call this case 2. In this case, a and b are fundamentally
indistinguishable, where they possess features which are indiscernible to humans, so
even rational beings are unable to tell any difference. Descartes sticks to the features
of dream states and awake states, which he claims to be identical in content, when
illustrating the problem. It makes sense to say that he implies that the subject is rational
and refers to the second interpretation (case 2) in the First Meditation. In that sense,
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, which results in a
great epistemic threat: it is impossible for the subject to distinguish between dream
states and awake states in principle. In this case, the problem can never be resolved as
there is no clue available for any rational beings to distinguish between these two kinds
of states. This will pose a great threat to the reliability of our whole knowledge system.
We may end up being trapped in a virtual reality without genuine knowledge about the
external world.

The arguments in the First Meditation are unnecessarily strong and fallacious. Features
(contents in particular) of dream states and awake states are the only factor Descartes
considers when he illustrates the problem, which is not comprehensive enough. He

Here I take rationality to be the ability of the subject to seek any clue to make a judgment about her
current state on a well-justified basis from the experience. She should be able to spot the difference
between the states in question (if there is any that can be spotted) and differentiate between them.
7
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presupposes reality-replicating features of dreams are the key to making faulty
judgments about one’s current state, which is misguided. He assumes that all dreams
replicate reality in every aspect and that even rational beings are not able to distinguish
between dream states and awake states. He does not address the possibility of having
non-reality-replicating dreams in the First Meditation. Those reality-replicating
dreams are just hypothetical dreams. It is unclear that whether there exist any realityreplicating dreams.5 That is unlikely to be the case, given our real-life experiences.
According to a dream research, dreams typically contain bizarre contents (Waters et al,
2016, p.1101), which rational beings are supposed to be able to note and use to make
a correct judgment about the dream state as their current state. If features or contents
of dreams are the source of the subject’s mistaken judgments about their current state,
then the subject should be able to note the bizarre contents and make a correct
judgment about the dream state. However, this is not the case. In non-lucid dreaming,
no matter how bizarre and ridiculous the dream contents are, the subject cannot tell
she is dreaming. 6 This shows that dream contents are not the source of mistaken
judgments about one’s current state and the main thing to deal with in order to resolve
the problem.

From the Epistemological Aspect to the Phenomenological Aspect of the Problem
Descartes is probably aware that his arguments in the First Meditation are
unnecessarily strong on reflection. In order to avoid the risk of collapsing the entire
knowledge system, he shifts to a weaker claim in the Sixth Meditation, where he holds

Reality-replicating dreams mean dreams which replicate reality in every detail such that there is no
clue for the (rational) subject to distinguish between dream states and awake states on a well-justified
basis from the experiential evidence. If there are reality-replicating dreams, then the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem is irresolvable.
5

6

The nonsensical or bizarre contents are usually readily accepted by the dreamer. (Waters et al, 2016,
p. 1101).
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that there is at least one considerable difference between awake states and dream states
such that they are not fundamentally indistinguishable. We should dispel the worries
of inevitable faulty judgments about one’s current state mentioned in the First
Meditation.

“I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to
me by my senses. And I ought to set aside all the doubts of these past days as
hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that very common uncertainty respecting
sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking state…I find a very notable
difference between the two…our memory can never connect our dreams one with the
other, or with the whole course of our lives, as it unites events which happen to us
while we are awake...I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am
waking and not during sleep.”
(Descartes, 1641/1911, P.32)

Descartes thinks the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem is resolved by
pointing out this difference between dream states and awake states. That can only show
dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable, and show A1
is unsound. When there is a discernible difference between these two kinds of states,
the subject who is rational (in standard awake states) can discern the difference and
tell she is being awake rather than dreaming. In other words, there is something that
can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in a dream state when she is
actually in an awake state. This shows that P1 of A1 is false. The whole argument of
A1 collapses.

9

Is the problem fully resolved by collapsing just A1? In other words, can the problem
be illustrated in the form of A1 only? Sosa (2005) thinks so. He thinks A1 is the source
of epistemic threat. He believes if A1 is rejected, the epistemic worries are dispelled
naturally. Before we find the answer to these questions, let us look at what kind of
epistemic threat A1 and A2 illustrate respectively.

A1:
When the subject cannot know she is in an awake state, she cannot tell she is being
awake on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. She may think she is
dreaming or being awake without a well-justified ground on which the judgment is
made. She may deny percepts and the information about the external world. She may
take what she actually perceives to be internal mental activities;7 She may also take
internal mental activities to be percepts. In this case, the subject may suspend beliefs,
hold false beliefs, or hold true but unjustified beliefs. Knowledge is defined as
undefeated justified true belief (Paxson, 1969). For something to be counted as
knowledge, the subject should be aware of the appropriate causal relations and form
judgements accordingly.8 This is not the case with the scenario illustrated by A1. The
subject is not aware of the causal relations and does not form a well-justified judgment.
Therefore, no knowledge results.

A2:
When the subject cannot know she is in a dream state, she takes dream states to be
awake states. She mistakenly takes dreams to be percepts and ends up having false
Percepts should stand in appropriate relations to external stimuli (Brogaard & Gatzia, 2017; Gibson,
1970). It is not the case with dreams, for they are generated internally. Dream contents may be affected
by the surrounding environment but dreams are not caused by sensory inputs (Noreika et al, 2010, p.40).
8
There are different accounts of knowledge. I do not look into all of them, due to the limited space
here. For the purpose of my thesis here, I interpret Paxson’s definition of knowledge as such.
10
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beliefs about the external world. Even if she happens to form true beliefs, they are not
formed on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. According to the
knowledge theory mentioned above, no knowledge results.

Both A1 and A2 yield an epistemic threat where no knowledge results, in a different
sense. Collapsing A1 does not entail that A2 also collapses. The epistemic threat
brought by A2 is still in force and needs to be addressed. Therefore, Sosa is mistaken
in thinking that just collapsing A1 can resolve the problem.

It is not difficult to collapse A1 and resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem.
This task is already accomplished by Descartes’s arguments in the Sixth Meditation. It
is a bit more challenging to collapse A2 and resolve the phenomenological aspect of
the problem. It is impossible to show P1 of A2 is false due to the occurrence of nonlucid dreaming. Rather, we should argue that P2 of A2 is false, using the occurrence
of lucid dreaming. To resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem, we should
bridge the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming.9

Descartes just stops at the first step without moving on to collapse A2 and resolve the
phenomenological aspect of the problem. The considerable difference he mentions
cannot collapse A2 as it does not apply to non-lucid dreaming. The difference
Descartes mentions is about the features of the states. He alludes to the features (and
contents in particular) of dreams both when he sketches the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem in the First Meditation and when he tries to resolve it in
the Sixth Meditation. In the First Meditation, he sticks to hypothetical reality-

9

More detail in Chapter 3.
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replicating dreams. In the Sixth Meditation, he simply rules out the possibility of
having reality-replicating dreams and sticks to real dreams encountered in daily life,
which contain bizarre features (that rational beings are able to note). However, as
shown above, it is not the features of the states that result in the subject making a faulty
judgment about her current state. It is the absence of the ability to reflect on the actual
state one is experiencing that results in faulty judgments. Such a reflective ability of
the subject enables the subject to make a correct judgment about her current state on a
well-justified basis from the experience, with the assumptions that there are no realityreplicating dreams and rational beings are able to discern the differences between
dreams and reality. Such an ability is present in lucid dreaming (where the subject can
tell she is dreaming) but absent in non-lucid dreaming (where the subject cannot tell
she is dreaming)10.

From Descartes’s arguments in the Sixth Meditation, that kind of reflective ability is a
necessary condition for the subject to discern the difference between dream states and
awake states. In other words, in order to resolve the problem, the condition has to be
met. However, the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming is a phenomenon where the
condition mentioned is not met. He does not address non-lucid dreaming at all, where
such a (full-fledged) reflective ability is absent. As I have shown, we need to show
both A1 and A2 are unsound, and resolve both the epistemological and the
phenomenological aspects of the problem, in order to dispel all epistemic threats

There are different degrees of lucidity in lucid dreams. Usually lucid dreams are defined as the
subject being aware of the fact that she is in a dream state. I take that general definition. There is also
some degree of lucidity in non-lucid dreaming where the subject can think and reason more than we
assume, but the subject is still unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state (Noreika et al, 2010, p.
40). Reflective ability of different degree is present in both non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming. The
ability I have been talking about is the full-fledged reflective ability that enables the subject to realize
the fact that she is in a dream state.
10
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involved. The fundamental difference in features between dream states and awake
states Descartes mentions can only collapse A1 and resolve the epistemological aspect
of the problem. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming remains a challenge for him,
unless he collapses A2 and resolves the phenomenological aspect of the problem.

Can the concept of imagination resolve the problem?
Descartes discusses imaginings in the Sixth Meditation. This is believed to be helpful
in constructing the difference between dream states and awake states.

“I never have believed myself to feel anything in waking moments which I cannot also
sometimes believe myself to feel when I sleep, and as I do not think that these things
which I seem to feel in sleep , proceed from objects outside of me, I do not see any
reason why I should have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive while
awake.”
(Descartes, 1641/1911, p.27)

He also mentions that a particular effort should be involved in the imagination process.
That involves a standard conception of imaginings as being an active mental activity,
as in our general understanding and the usage of the term “imagination”. There is an
implication behind this conception, namely that the subject’s awareness of the
imagining state is usually involved, which results in the subject not believing that the
contents of imaginings stand in any direct causal relations to external stimuli and not
taking the contents of imaginings to be a source of knowledge about the external world.
Therefore, we are usually not deceived by our imaginings. That is Descartes’s strategy
in resolving the indistinguishability problem. Dreams are imaginings produced in our
13

mind and therefore not deceptive in nature. In standard wake states, (rational) people
will not be deceived by imaginings. That is what I call the awake-state stereotyped
conception of imaginings, where a higher-order awareness of the actual (imagining)
state the subject is experiencing is presupposed. Simply using that conception cannot
resolve the phenomenological aspect of the indistinguishability problem. Non-lucid
dreaming, where the subject does not have such a higher-order awareness, still remains
unexplained. The awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings also features in
the approaches of McGinn, Ichikawa and Sosa. Following Descartes’s route, they try
to resolve the awake-dream indistinguishability problem by adhering to such a
conception. As I will show, their arguments are misguided. They fail to resolve any
form or any aspect of the problem.

In the following chapter, I will point out the problematic arguments of the imagination
theorists of dreaming. I mainly pick out two for discussion, which are the sharp
distinction between percepts and images and the denial of belief in dreams. These two
are the main strategies McGinn, Ichikawa, and Sosa adopt when they defend the
imagination view of dreaming. I argue these two ways do not help them resolve but
only worsen the problem.

14

CHAPTER 2: The Imagination View of Dreaming
In this chapter, I point out the fallacious arguments of three contemporary philosophers
defending the imagination view of dreaming. They are McGinn (2004), Ichikawa
(2008, 2009), and Sosa (2005). Their main strategies are denying that percepts occur
in dreams by holding a sharp distinction between percepts and images along with
denying that beliefs occur in dreams.11 Among the three, Ichikawa holds the strongest
version, which denies that percepts and beliefs occur in dreams; McGinn denies
percepts occur in dreams while Sosa denies beliefs occur in dreams. One problem lies
in the sharp distinction between percepts and images drawn by McGinn and Ichikawa.
Such a sharp distinction involves what I call the awake-state stereotyped conception
of images (with the subject’s awareness of the fact that she is in an imagining state),
which is an obstacle in accounting for non-lucid dreaming (where the subject is
unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state). The sharp distinction also involves a
misconception of taking hallucinations to be percepts, which poses a further threat to
the reliability of perceptual knowledge. I will show that such a sharp distinction does
not resolve any form or any aspect of the problem. Another problem lies in the denial
of belief in dreams. It fails to provide sufficient explanatory power of the dream
experience and begs the question of what constitutes the faulty judgments made in
dreams. This chapter is divided into two parts, each focusing on one approach: A) the
sharp distinction between percepts and images and B) the denial of belief in dreams.
The imagination view of dreaming aims at resolving the awake-dreaming

A sharp distinction between percepts and images means they are dichotomously distinct from each
other by their very nature. Percepts are the products of genuine perceptual experiences. For the
definition of images, McGinn endorses the picture theory of images while Ichikawa’s account does not
commit to any theory of images. To avoid confusion, I take what they mean by “images” to be perceptual
imaginings. Note that I do not hold a sharp distinction between percepts and images. This is an approach
McGinn and Ichikawa adopt to help prove that dreams are images rather than percepts and thus dreams
are products of imagination. I will show this approach is misguided.
15
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indistinguishability problem. However, none of the imagination theorists of dreaming
mentioned above explicate the problem before they attempt to resolve it.12 As argued
in chapter 1, the problem should be interpreted in the form of A1 and A2. The
imagination theorists are not explicit in showing whether their arguments target A1 or
A2. There are some clues in Sosa’s arguments. Sosa (2005) thinks A1 is the cause of
skeptical worries. He thinks A2 does not pose an epistemic threat in a way that matters
and therefore can be put aside.13 Therefore, it is very likely that his arguments target
A1. He suggests the problem (A1) can be resolved by the automatic justification of
wakefulness affirmation. 14 Ichikawa (2008) disagrees. It is unclear whether he
disagrees because he thinks the problem (A1) cannot be resolved or because he thinks
it cannot be resolved by the “automatic affirmation” argued by Sosa. In his Dreaming
and Imagination, Ichikawa (2009) says he partially agrees with Sosa (in that we do not
form false beliefs in dreams), but it is by no means clear which form of the problem
his arguments target.

Ichikawa (2009) thinks the orthodox view of dreaming which entails percepts and
beliefs are present herein is the source of making faulty judgments about one’s current
state and the basis of the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. He interprets
the orthodox view as the following:

They use the term “dream skepticism”, without any definition. I assume it is what I call the awakedreaming indistinguishability problem.
13
I argue this is not the case in chapter 1.
14
It is briefly as “if I think, I am awake”.
16
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“Percepts: Dreaming involves percepts—sensory experiences of the sort we
experience during our waking interaction with the world. These percepts are typically
misleading; they give us the experience as of perceiving something that is not there.
Beliefs:

Dreaming involves beliefs—typically false ones. When we dream that p, we

believe that p. Since in many such cases, p is false, dreaming often involves false
beliefs.”
(p. 104)
The way Ichikawa interprets the orthodox view may give a hint on which form of the
indistinguishability problem he is addressing. He focuses on faulty judgments made in
dream states. It makes sense to say his arguments target A2. However, as argued in
Chapter 1, in order to resolve the problem, we need to collapse both A1 and A2.
Therefore, when I analyze his arguments, I will see whether they can collapse both A1
and A2. I will also see whether they can resolve any aspect of the problem.
McGinn (2004) is not explicit in showing what constitutes the problem. In his
imagination theory of dreaming, he also rejects the claim that percepts occur in dreams
by holding a sharp distinction between percepts and images, like Ichikawa. McGinn is
even more devoted in drawing such a sharp distinction.15 I assume he takes “dreams
as percepts” to be the basis of the problem. Similar to what I say about Ichikawa’s
arguments above, McGinn’s arguments seem to target A2, but they should also target
A1, in order to resolve the problem. Now let us evaluate the sharp distinction
arguments made by McGinn and Ichikawa.

15

He lists a lot of characteristics to sharply differentiate between percepts and images.
17

A) The Sharp Distinction between Percepts and Images

1. Why do they draw a sharp distinction?
To start with, we need to find out the reason why McGinn and Ichikawa draw a sharp
distinction between percepts and images and how it relates to the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem, before we judge whether such a sharp distinction is
useful for resolving the problem. As one of the main approaches of the imagination
view of dreaming, the sharp distinction between percepts and images is supposed to
be used to defend this view and resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability
problem. It should work this way:16

From the sharp distinction between percepts and images to that between percepts and
dreams:
P1) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and images.
P2) Dreams involve images but not percepts.
C) Therefore, there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams.

How the sharp distinction between percepts and dreams helps resolve the awakedreaming indistinguishability problem:
P1*) If there is a sharp distinction between two states, the subject can distinguish
between them and tell which state they are currently in.
P2*) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams.
P3*) If there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams, there is a sharp
distinction between awake states and dream states.
P4*) There is a sharp distinction between awake states and dream states. (modus
McGinn and Ichikawa are not explicit in showing how the sharp distinction helps resolve the problem.
(They do not even explicate the problem.) I just infer how it should work.
18
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ponens, P3*&P2*)
C*) Thus, the subject can distinguish between awake states and dream states and
tell which state they are currently in. (modus ponens, P4*&P1*)

If the above arguments are sound, the sharp distinction helps resolve the problem: C*
collapses both A1 and A2 and resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem.17
This should be the onset purpose of the move. However, I show that according to their
arguments, P1 is false. The whole argument is unsound and does not help resolve the
awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.

2. How do they draw the sharp distinction?
2.1. Hallucinations as percepts
McGinn and Ichikawa do not deeply study the nature of percepts and hallucinations
and take them to be the same, which is misguided. Hallucinations should not be
regarded as percepts.

McGinn and Ichikawa think hallucinations and percepts have subjectively
indistinguishable phenomenal characters. 18 However, those are just hypothetical
hallucinations. When we look at actual hallucinations, hallucinatory and perceptual
experiences are not necessarily subjectively indistinguishable.19 According to Allen

The sharp distinction does not address the phenomenological aspect of the problem.
This is evident in their arguments, which address lower-order hallucinations where the subject does
not know she is hallucinating and takes hallucinations to be percepts. For example, McGinn (2004)
writes, “If dreams were hallucinatory percepts, they would generate, or be accompanied by, an
observational attitude. While (unknowingly) hallucinating a conversation between two people, one will
ﬁnd oneself straining to hear better what is being said and orienting one’s eyes so as to gain the best
possible view” (p. 76).
19
If two states are subjectively indistinguishable, the subject cannot distinguish between them and
know the actual state she is experiencing. If she knows, these two states are not subjectively
indistinguishable.
19
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(2015)’s findings, around half of regularly hallucinating subjects are aware of
themselves hallucinating. Such a figure is interesting as one cannot draw a unitary
account of the subject’s cognitive awareness that can be applied to all hallucinations.
It can be higher-order (that the subject is aware of the hallucinating state and does not
take it to be a source of perceptual knowledge about the external world); it can also be
lower-order (that the subject is not aware of the hallucinating state and takes
hallucinations to be percepts), due to the diversity of hallucinations. There are simple
and complex hallucinations (Waters et al., 2016). Simple hallucinations like linear
ones (that do not fit with reality) can be easily realized, if the subject is rational. Even
though they appear to be received through the senses, it is not true that they are percepts
due to epistemic impossibility.20 For complex hallucinations where their contents fit
with reality, the matter is more complicated.

According to Gibson (1970), a rational subject can tell whether she is perceiving or
hallucinating in normal circumstances. This implies that percepts and hallucinations
are not fundamentally indistinguishable and the subject can tell whether they are
having percepts or hallucinations. A key difference between percepts and
hallucinations is that percepts are caused externally. An appropriate external stimulus
has to be present, in order for the experience to be called “perceptual”. Hallucinations
are not percepts in that hallucinations are caused internally where an appropriate
external stimulus is absent. Percepts differ from hallucinations in that percepts are
“explorable, or investigable or susceptible to increased clarity by sense-organ
adjustment” (ibid., p. 426).21 To tell whether something is a percept or a hallucination,
It is impossible for such content to have any corresponding objects in the external world. This may
be related to our background knowledge. For example, what is possible in reality and what is impossible
in reality.
21
That is how he differentiates between percepts and images. He takes hallucinations to be images.
(This idea is consistent with some psychological definitions of hallucinations which take hallucinations
to be a creation of ideas resembling sensation (Brierre de Boismont, A., 1859).) Therefore, such a
20
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one can test via sense-organ adjustment, for example, by closing one eye or moving
one’s head, to see if there is any “corresponding change of stimulation”.22 If there is,
it is a percept. If there is none, it is a hallucination.

Gibson (1970) also addresses lower-order hallucinations. Irrational observers (those
with diseases or under the influence of drugs) may fail to apply the test to see whether
there exist external stimuli and end up being unaware of the fact that they are
hallucinating. However, this does not mean percepts and hallucinations are
subjectively indistinguishable by their very nature. He thinks the test, if applied, can
tell whether one is perceiving or hallucinating (imagining) (in most cases). Applying
Gibson’s account to Allen (2015)’s findings, half of the regularly hallucinating
subjects do not know they are hallucinating because they don’t or fail to apply the test
(due to some constraints), not because hallucinations and percepts are subjectively
indistinguishable by their very nature. The ability to distinguish between them
involves rationality of the subject which enables her to attend to the experiential
evidence to make a well-justified judgment. Such a process may involve the subject’s
background knowledge of the world. For example, flying pigs do not exist (in the
current world we are living). If we “encounter” a flying pig, provided that we are not
engaging in any form of fiction (for example watching movies), it is very likely that it
is a hallucination.23
2.1.1. The problem of taking hallucinations to be percepts
The concepts of percepts and hallucinations are intertwined in the sharp distinction

difference also applies to hallucinations.
22
The target senses should not be closed. For example, if we are testing whether there is any external
visual input, at least one of our eyes needs to be open, so as to allow reception of external visual signals.
23
It is also possible that part of it is a percept and part of it is a hallucination. For example, I am really
seeing a pig but I am hallucinating it is flying.
21

arguments of McGinn and Ichikawa. When McGinn talks about the “percept theory”,
it is unclear whether he is talking about percepts or hallucinations, which I have shown
to be very different in nature. From the characteristics he uses to draw the sharp
distinction between percepts and images, the arguments target both percepts and
hallucinations and fail to resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.
Hallucinations as percepts, which means hallucinations and percepts are subjectively
indistinguishable by their very nature, will pose a further epistemic threat where the
subject may be mistaken in her beliefs about what the external world is like, even if
she is awake. It fails to dispel the epistemic threat brought by A1 and A2.
From A1, the subject cannot know she is in an awake state. After collapsing A1, the
subject should be able to know she is awake. More importantly, she should know she
is having (genuine) perceptual experiences which inform her of the external world. If
hallucinations and percepts have subjectively indistinguishable phenomenal characters,
the subject does not know whether they are encountering percepts or hallucinations.
They may deny that they are having percepts (when they are actually having percepts).
They may also take hallucinations to be percepts. This is similar to the epistemic threat
brought by A1 and A2, just with “dream state” replaced by “hallucinating state” and
“dreams” replaced by “hallucinations”.
2.2. Characteristics used to draw the sharp distinction
McGinn lists a lot of characteristics to sharply differentiate between percepts and
images. I do not discuss each one of them, due to the limited length of this thesis. I
pick out some for discussion. Each argument below involves the misconception of
hallucinations as percepts, which collapses the sharp distinction between percepts and
images. For some arguments, the sharp distinction between percepts and images
22

collapses even without considering hallucinations. Each argument also implies the
awake-stereotyped conception of images.
2.2.1. Active sensory apparatus and information about the surrounding
environment
One of the characteristics McGinn (2004) uses for the sharp distinction between
percepts and images is the role of percepts in informing the subject of the surrounding
environment: percepts are informative about the surrounding environment while
images are not. He thinks the active operation of the sensory apparatus gives us
information about the surrounding environment (ibid., p.80). He says the percept
theory entails that the sensory apparatus becomes active again during dreaming, which
he claims to be clearly false. He thinks this is false because: the sensory apparatus is
not active during sleep and dreams do not inform us of the surrounding environment.
In fact, the sensory apparatus can be deemed “active” during dreaming. Moreover, it
does not follow that if the sensory apparatus is deemed active, percepts (and
information about the surrounding environment) will result. Gibson (1970) uses the
example of dreaming to illustrate that the perceptual system or what McGinn calls the
sensory apparatus can be active without yielding percepts:

“in a night dream the inputs of the optic nerves are missing and ocular adjustments, if
they occurred, would have no effect on the inputs of the optic nerves. Note that, on this
theory, the rapid eye-movements that accompany night dreams are frustrated efforts of
the perceptual system to explore an ambient optic array that cannot be sampled because
the eyes are closed, or an optic array that does not even exist because of darkness.”
(p.426)
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Percepts should bear appropriate causal relations with external stimuli. In other words,
the subject should attend to the external signals and interpret them in an appropriate
way. Otherwise, percepts do not result. During sleep and dreams, the sensory apparatus
is actively working and readily receiving (both internal and external) signals. Some
sense organs, for example eyes, are closed and external stimulation through those
senses is blocked out. Even if some external signals, for example auditory signals, are
not blocked out, they are not interpreted in an appropriate way during sleep and
dreams.24 Therefore, percepts do not result.

When McGinn takes hallucinations to be percepts, he collapses his own sharp
distinction between percepts and images. From his argument, an active sensory
apparatus provides information of the surrounding environment. I reckon that the
sensory apparatus is active during hallucinations, based on Gibson (1970)’s theory, but
hallucinations do not provide information about the external environment as they are
generated internally and bear no (direct) causal relations with external stimuli. During
hallucinations, which often occur in awake states, the hallucinating experience can be
parallel with the perceptual experience of the subject.

2.2.2. Kind of experience and consciousness
McGinn (2004) thinks the percept theory is wrong because the same kind of experience
cannot occur in both awake states and dream states. He draws a sharp distinction
between percepts and images in terms of the nature of experience concerning
consciousness. He uses three arguments to show that. The first argument concerns
During sleep and dreams, the body is at rest. The mind is not actively interpreting the external signals
and directing the body to respond in an appropriate way. If the signals are intensive, for example: a fire
alarm is going off, the resting state of the body may be disrupted and the subject may wake up. If the
signals are soft, for example: people are whispering, the body may remain in sleep and dreams. Dream
content may be affected by those signals.
24
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percepts’ causal role in one’s awakening, with Ichikawa arguing along the lines. The
second argument concerns the ability of ending one state with another kind of state.
The third argument concerns the brain-in-a-vat experiment. I will show all of them are
misguided.

2.2.2.1. The casual role of percepts in one’s awakening
McGinn (2004) writes, “How can I start having the very same type of experiences,
subjectively considered, during unconscious sleep that I have while awake and
conscious? Wouldn’t the onset of such experiences wake me up?” (p. 80)

The last claim involves a problematic argument similar to Ichikawa’s in the causal role
of percepts.

2.2.2.1.1. Ichikawa’s puzzling argument on the causal role of percepts
Among his arguments to differentiate between percepts and imagery, Ichikawa (2009)
writes,

“When I am asleep, a loud noise will typically wake me up. My phone rings, and my
sleep is interrupted. The obvious explanation for the causal power of that phone is that
it causes auditory experiences-percepts-and those percepts cause me to wake up.”
(p.108).

He uses this argument to show that dreams are not percepts but imagery. The argument
can be understood as follows:
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P1) Percepts can cause one to wake up from sleep.
P2) Images cannot cause one to wake up.
P3) Dreams do not cause us to wake up.
P4) Dreams involve either percepts or images.
C) Thus, dreams involve images rather than percepts.

It is ambiguous how he takes percepts to be the cause of one’s awakening. (I reckon it
makes sense to say percepts are the direct cause of awakening in his argument.)
According to Locke (2016), “A percept is something which exists only in so far as it
is perceived...These sense-dependent percepts might also be said to be mental, in the
sense that they have no spatial location, and private, in the special sense that can be
perceived by only one person, the person whose percept it is.” (p.20)
If percepts are mental, there may be no crucial difference in the causal roles between
percepts and images in one’s awakening. Even if there is, it is by no means obvious.
One cannot take it for granted without trying to explicate the difference. Moreover,
percepts are supposed to be caused by external objects and therefore the cause of one’s
awakening shall be ultimately external, but Ichikawa denies such an external cause.

“Perhaps she will suggest that it is not my auditory experience that wakes me, but the
sound waves hitting my ear. Such alternate explanations do not strike me as
particularly plausible.” (Ichikawa, 2009, p.108)

Such an argument is puzzling to me. It is unlikely that he takes percepts to be external
but he does not explicate the difference between percepts and mental images in their
causal roles in one’s awakening. He writes as if such a difference was so obvious that
26

no explanation is needed but I do not think so. I think one’s awakening can be caused
internally or externally (subject to empirical studies though):

1) Caused internally: awakened from a dream (e.g. a nightmare) where emotions
are so intense that sleep is interrupted
2) Caused externally: awakened by the external environment, for example, a
change in temperature, a (considerably loud) noise, or an abrupt change in
one’s physical position (e.g. falling off one’s bed, being pushed forcefully…),
etc.

It is unlikely that Ichikawa refers to the first case mentioned (awakening caused
internally) and it is perplexing that he refers to the second case but denies external
causes. I think he should define percepts to give a clear account of the difference
between percepts and images, as well as the difference between their causal roles in
the related respect. He should explain why percepts are the direct cause of awakening
and why such an internal cause is not applicable to images. He should also account for
the first case and the difference between the two cases in terms of causal relations,
which I believe to be a very difficult (or even implausible) task if one does not allude
to external causes.

2.2.2.1.2. The problem of the causal role of percepts in one’s awakening
McGinn and Ichikawa are misguided in what wakes the dreaming subject up. The
ambiguous account of percepts and the allusion to their causal role in one’s awakening
to percepts are misleading. McGinn’s claim that the onset of perceptual experiences
would wake the dreaming subject up is misguided in a similar way as Ichikawa’s
27

argument above.25 The cause of one’s awakening can be internal or external. If the
cause of awakening is internal, it is the internal signals generated within the body
(regardless of the external environment) that cause the dreaming subject to wake up.
If the cause of awakening is external, it is the external signals that wake the subject up.
This kind of process is physiological, as opposed to the mental process of percepts.
Whether the cause of awakening is internal or external, it is not percepts that cause the
dreaming subject to wake up because the necessary condition of percepts, namely that
the subject interprets the external signals in an appropriate way, is absent in the
dreaming subject.

If the cause of awakening is external, then there may come a question: under what
circumstances will a dreaming subject be woken up by an external stimulus?
According to Gibson’s theory, the sensory apparatus is active during dreaming and
therefore the body is readily receiving inputs from the surrounding environment. When
will the external inputs successfully stimulate the subject to wake up from sleep (or a
dream)? This is an empirical issue. The salient point is that it is misguided to claim
percepts cause one to wake up while dreams do not for arbitrary or unclearly clarified
reason.

Moreover, if McGinn and Ichikawa take hallucinations to be percepts, hallucinations
should also have the same causal role as that of percepts in one’s awakening, according
to their arguments. This is by no means clear. If the cause of awakening is external,
I assume what McGinn means by “perceptual experiences that wake one up” is “percepts that wake
one up”, like the way Ichikawa argues, but McGinn does not deny external causes like Ichikawa does,
at least not in an explicit way. McGinn does not construct the details of such an argument. It is just one
sentence. If he denies external causes in one’s awakening, his argument has the same problem as
Ichikawa’s; if he does not deny external causes, he is misguided in the causal role of percepts in one’s
awakening. Whichever way he argues, it is misguided to use “percepts wake one up” to sharply
differentiate between percepts and images.
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hallucinations do not wake one up as such external causes are absent in hallucinations.
If the cause of awakening is internal, it is not absolutely clear that it is hallucinations
that cause the awakening. It is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between
hallucinations and images in terms of their causal role in one’s awakening. The sharp
distinction between percepts and images in terms of their causal role in one’s
awakening collapses anyway.

2.2.2.2. Ending one state with another
Besides the misconstrued casual role of percepts (and hallucinations) in one’s
awakening, McGinn (2004) goes on arguing for the claim that the same kind of
experience cannot occur during awake states and dream states:

“Suppose I have taken a drug and am hallucinating liberally; I want to put an end to
this state of mind, so I try to go to sleep. Don’t I succeed if I do go to sleep? Doesn’t
sleep precisely put an end to sensory hallucination, as it does to ordinary veridical
perception? It’s not that I merely replace one type of hallucination with another. But
the percept theory cannot accept this piece of common sense, since it takes sleep to be
just the beginning of exactly the same type of state of consciousness.” (P.81)

The argument can be construed in the following form:
P1) When I hallucinate, I can end the hallucination by going to sleep.
P2) We can end a state with another state only if they involve different types of
consciousness.
P3) If dreams, which occur during sleep, are hallucinations, I cannot end hallucinations
by going to sleep because dreams and sleep have the same type of consciousness.
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P4) I can end hallucinations by going to sleep.
C) Therefore, dreams are not hallucinations.

This is not a sound argument. First, he presupposes awake states are a necessary
condition of hallucinations, like the case of percepts: If you perceive, you are awake.
If you are not awake, you do not perceive.26 Taking hallucinations to be percepts, so
it follows that: if you hallucinate, you are awake; if you are not awake, you do not
hallucinate. This is not true, at least not deductively, for awake states are not a
necessary condition of hallucinations: unlike percepts, which requires the senses to be
open to receive external signals, hallucinations, which are not caused by an external
source, do not need to receive external signals and therefore the senses are not required
to be open (theoretically). Second, he holds that awake states and dream states do not
involve the same kind of experience, namely that awake states are conscious states
while dream states are not. What he means by consciousness is vague. Does
consciousness mean the ability to think? Or just simply being awake? If he means the
latter and uses that to justify the claim that dream states are not conscious states, this
is just an awake-state stereotyped conception. Simply taking consciousness to be
wakefulness and presupposing the same kind of consciousness cannot occur in both
awake states and dream states is not a comprehensive account of consciousness and is
an unfair treatment of dreaming.27 If he means the former, then it is wrong to say
dream states are not conscious states, as it is shown that the dreaming subject is able
to think and reason in both non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming (Noreika et al.,
2010). This whole argument is misguided.

Perceptual experiences require the senses to be open to actively interpret the external sensory inputs.
If the subject is not awake, perceptual experiences do not take place as the external signals cannot be
interpreted.
27
Dreams do not take place in awake states: if I dream, I am not awake; if I am awake, I do not dream.
30
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2.2.2.3. The brain-in-a-vat argument
Another argument McGinn (2004) uses to defend the claim that the same kind of
experience cannot occur in both awake states and dream states is the brain-in-a-vat
argument:

“When the perpetually hallucinating brain in a vat goes to sleep, there is a change in
its state of consciousness; life is not one long dream to this subject of consciousness.
The dreaming brain in a vat is in a different state of consciousness from the waking
(but hallucinating) brain in a vat.” (p.81)

McGinn takes a hallucinating brain in a vat to be “a waking brain in a vat”. The reasons
behind are: he takes hallucinations to be percepts and presupposes awake states are a
necessary condition of hallucinations, which I have already shown to be false. It is
misguided to take hallucinations to be percepts and think awake states are a necessary
condition of hallucinations. It is also misguided to think a hallucinating brain in a vat
entails “a waking brain in a vat” and take a hallucinating brain in a vat to be “a waking
brain in a vat”.
The brain-in-a-vat argument is traditionally used to question the reliability of
perceptual knowledge, namely beliefs about the external world. The argument is as
follows:

If I know that p, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat.
I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
Therefore, I do not know that p.
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where p is a proposition about what the external world is like.

This argument poses a challenge to the whole knowledge system about the external
world by showing that if one cannot rule out the possibility that one is a brain in a vat,
beliefs regarding what the external world is like may end up being false.28 Here it is
very important to distinguish between wakefulness and hallucinations, since there is a
significant difference between “a waking brain in a vat” and a hallucinating brain in a
vat which leads to a different interpretation of the brain-in-a-vat experiment. “A
waking brain in a vat” may involve the possibility of knowing one is a brain in a vat
and therefore restoring the reliability of perceptual knowledge but a hallucinating brain
in a vat does not involve such a possibility. Moreover, it is not necessary to differentiate
between a hallucinating brain in a vat and a dreaming brain in a vat as the nature of
experience is more or less the same (where no perceptual knowledge results). However,
under some condition there is a significant difference between “a waking brain in a
vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat.
If it is a disembodied brain in a vat, it is not of much value to differentiate between “a
waking brain in a vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat, as there is no significant difference
in the nature of the experiences in terms of consciousness and the yielding of
perceptual knowledge.
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There are no perceptual organs and no perceptual

experiences, let alone perceptual knowledge.30 The brain in a vat is doomed to be
deceived, if the subject comes to believe she is perceiving. If it is an embodied brain

If you are a brain in a vat, you are stimulated by a supercomputer to have experiences which are
qualitatively indistinguishable from genuine perceptual experiences, from the first-person perspective.
If you come to believe you are really perceiving any external object, you are mistaken.
29
Actually the term “waking” should be avoided as the senses are absent. It is nonsensical to say the
brain is awake when the body is absent.
30
In this case, it is like two layers of dream states: I dream in my dream.
32
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in a vat, there are two possible cases: embodied but without connection to senses;
embodied with connection to senses. For the former case, there is no significant
difference between the two brains in a vat in question in terms of consciousness and
the yielding of perceptual knowledge, just like the case of disembodied brains in a vat.
For the latter case, “a waking brain in a vat” means the subject’s senses are open as it
is nonsensical to claim the subject is awake and the senses are not open.31 In that case,
what is the difference between a “waking brain in a vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat?
A waking brain in a vat means it is possible for the subject to know she is a brain in
vat because she can perceive and test what she seems to perceive is what she really
perceives, according to Gibson’s theory of perception.32 The subject may not or fail
to apply the test, and is completely deceived. However, it is possible for a waking brain
in a vat to realize she is a brain in a vat and perceptual knowledge is possible, if awake
states and dream states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. The possibility of
perceptual knowledge, which comes from percepts, is the key difference between a
waking brain in a vat and a dreaming brain in a vat (or a hallucinating brain in a vat).
Such a possibility is not involved in a dreaming brain in a vat or a hallucinating brain
in a vat.

As argued above, a hallucinating brain in a vat is not the same as and does not entail a
waking brain in a vat. A hallucinating brain in a vat is not necessarily in a different
state of consciousness from that of a dreaming brain in a vat in terms of consciousness

I doubt whether this is possible. At least this is not how the brain in a vat experiment is usually
presented. If it is an embodied brain in a vat, it is usually construed as the senses being closed where
the subject does not respond to external stimulation in the same way as when they are awake.
32
This is true only if dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. The active
perception theory does not collapse the brain in a vat argument as it cannot rule out the possibility that
one is a brain in a vat, if the images generated by the supercomputer can be identical to percepts. If
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, even if the subject can perceive, it
is impossible for him to tell whether something is really a percept or not based on the available evidences
and provided that he is rational.
33
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and the yielding of perceptual knowledge. Whether it is a disembodied brain in a vat
or an embodied brain in a vat, the nature of the experience is more or less same: no
perceptual knowledge results. If the subject believes she is perceiving, she is doomed
to be deceived. One may question whether it is possible for a hallucinating brain in a
vat to be awake? In other words, can a brain in a vat be both hallucinating and waking?
The answer is yes (if a waking brain in a vat is possible) as hallucinating and perceptual
experiences can be parallel. There are two interpretations of a waking but hallucinating
brain in vat. The first one is: perceptual and hallucinating experiences are
indistinguishable. That poses a great threat to perceptual knowledge. In that case, there
is no significant difference between the brain in a vat discussed and a dreaming brain
in a vat in terms of consciousness and the yielding of perceptual knowledge as no
perceptual knowledge results. The second one is the subject fails to or does not carry
out the test. However, in that case, the significant difference between the brain in a vat
discussed and a dreaming brain in a vat, namely the possibility of perceptual
knowledge, comes from percepts but not hallucinations.33 Using the term “a waking
but hallucinating brain in a vat” is just confusing and does not pinpoint the key
difference between the brains in a vat concerned. It just further worsens the epistemic
threat. McGinn’s brain-in-a-vat argument is misguided and does not help draw the
sharp distinction between percepts and images.

2.2.3. On the observational attitude
McGinn (2004) thinks hallucinations and percepts involve an observational attitude of
the subject while images do not. He gives an example of a lower-order hallucination.

Hallucinations, where an appropriate causal relation with external stimuli is absent, do not constitute
perceptual knowledge.
34
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“While (unknowingly) hallucinating a conversation between two people, one will find
oneself straining to hear better what is being said and orienting one’s eyes so as to gain
the best possible view.”
(ibid., p.76)

It is unclear what an observational attitude exactly means. Is it necessarily associated
with outward behavior (and the object of observation being external)? 34 Can the
content of observation be mental and internal? If the content of observation can be
mental and internal, it is questionable whether percepts always involve an
observational attitude and images do not. Whether I observe something or not depends
on my interest. If I am interested (in the content), I will observe. Otherwise, I will not.
This applies to both percepts and images. Using “observational attitude” to sharply
differentiate between percepts and images in this sense is misguided. If observational
attitudes have to be associated with behavior and the object of observation cannot be
internal, then the notion of “observational attitude” should not be applied to
hallucinations because hallucinations are internal, 35 but he does so. Therefore, the
sharp distinction also fails in this sense.

In addition, this sharp distinction is at risk of reaching a contradiction with another
sharp distinction that McGinn (2004) makes, namely that images are attentiondependent while percepts are not (p.78-79). If percepts are not attention-dependent,
they do not always involve an observational attitude; if percepts always involve an
observational attitude, they are attention-dependent.

I hold that if observational attitudes are necessarily associated with outward behavior, the object of
observation should be external. Otherwise, the action is insane.
35
There is no corresponding external stimulation and there is nothing to observe, if the content or object
of observation cannot be internal.
35
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2.2.4. Saturation and recognition
McGinn (2004) claims that images can have unfilled parts but it is not the case of
percepts and hallucinations. He claims that images are attention-dependent: parts
which we are interested in and attend to are filled; parts that we are not interested in
and do not attend to are unfilled and unspecified. To him, percepts do not work that
way. Every point of the sensory system is filled and we judge the identity of the object
we perceive from the sensory inputs. As appearances can be deceiving, the judgment
made can be fallacious, but it is not case with images. There is no such fallibility
because “knowledge of the objects of imagining is not so based”, “it derives rather
from stipulation, from the underlying intention”. (ibid., p.83) He claims that the
recognitional process of identity knowledge is only present in perceptual experiences
but not in imagining experiences, but the way he presents his argument for the image
theory shows such a recognitional process is also present in images.
“This account also accommodates something that the percept theory has great trouble
explaining: how we can know the identity of our dream objects even when their
appearance is grossly distorted.”
(ibid., p.83)

To him, we “just know” the identity of the object of imagining, not from any inferences.

“I once had a dream about a woman whose face was really only ﬁlled in around the
mouth area (large red lips), the rest of the face being left pretty much blank (I knew
quite well who she was) …” (ibid., p.85)
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From the above quotations, we can see he claims there is knowledge of identities of
the objects of images. That means the above claim “I know who she is” is true, which
I argue to be false.36

For the sake of clarity, I rewrite the claim: from “I know who she is” to “I know she is
y”.37 The claim that “I know she is y” involves a proposition about a person in the
external world: “she is y”. “She” denotes a person.38 “I know she is y”, if true, entails
knowledge of the identity of a person. Knowledge of identity of a person entails that
the proclaimed identity of that person is correct. In order for that to be true, there must
be an actual person who is the corresponding reference of “she” and that person must
be y. It is impossible to have knowledge of the identity of a person if that person (in
the external world) is not the corresponding referent. Therefore, the first condition for
“I know she is y” to be true is that person y must be the corresponding referent of “she”
(a correct identity). The second condition is that the judgment (she is y) is made on a
well-justified basis from a perceptual experience where there are appropriate causal
relations from which the subject derives the judgment “she is y”.39

It is misguided to claim “I know she is y” in the context of (pure) imagination because
there is no way for this claim to be true over imaginings. First, as shown above, the
proposition “she is y” is a proposition about a person in the external world where “she”
denotes a person. In that sense, there must be an external stimulus for this claim to be
true in the very beginning. Such a direct external cause is absent in imaginings. What

For the sake of simplicity, I change the tense and delete the adverbial phrase of the original claim. I
assume that does not alter the meaning in a way that matters.
37
“I know who she is” and “I know she is y” have the same meaning.
38
Sometimes “she” is used to refer to a non-person like a country, vehicle or other inanimate thing. In
the original phrase “who she is”, “who” refers to a person, so “she” also refers to a person in this context.
39
Knowledge is defined as undefeated justified true belief (Paxson, 1969).
37
36

“she” actually means in the above claim is just the content of imagination where there
is no external corresponding reference. “Who” and “she” should not be used to refer
to the content of imagination. Moreover, we should not say “there is knowledge of the
identity of the object of imagining” as “identity” and “object” also have allusion to
external objects. It is nonsensical to say there is knowledge of the identity of the
content of imagination when the external allusion brought by identity is absent. The
concept of identity knowledge is irrelevant to imagination.

It is misguided to derive beliefs about what the external world is like from the content
of imagination. If the judgment of the claim that “I know apples are red” is derived
from pure imagination, then the claim is false. This does not constitute knowledge
because this claim is not made on a well-justified basis. 40 This judgment is all
internally caused. States caused internally do not give knowledge about what the
external world is like. In this case, it just happens to be the case that apples are really
red. It is like you happen to have true beliefs by luck or coincidence. Luck and
coincidence does not constitute knowledge. Imagination, which is not caused by an
external stimulus, cannot give us knowledge about what the external world is like.

Is there knowledge of the content of imagination? In other words, should we apply the
concept of knowledge to the content of imagination? Is it the case that there is no
fallibility in “knowledge” about the content of imagination: I just know what I imagine
simply by introspection, like what McGinn claims? It is not absolutely clear whether
there is knowledge of the content of imagination. This can be controversial. I do not

For this claim to be made on a well-justified basis, the primary condition is that there must be
perceptual experiences. “Apples are red” is a proposition about the external world. For “I know apples
are red” to be true, an experience caused externally, namely perceptual one, has to be involved.
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attempt to deal with it and I think I do not have to now. If there is knowledge of the
content of imagination, there will be truth conditions for the content of imagination,
sticking to the definition of knowledge I have been using. Then it is possible that these
truth conditions are not met and it is possible that we form a faculty judgment over
what we imagine. We cannot be sure we are right about our what we imagine simply
by introspection, given that introspection can be unreliable. I do not agree with
McGinn that there is no fallibility in the knowledge of the content of imagination (if
there is any) acquired by introspection.

The way McGinn puts it “no fallibility in knowledge of the identity of the object of
imagining”, is misguided in three ways. First, knowledge of identity of objects alludes
to an external sense, which is irrelevant to imagination. Second, even if there is
knowledge of the content of imagination, it does not grant that we never form mistaken
judgment about what we imagine. The way he presents his arguments collapses his
sharp distinction between percepts and images in terms of recognitional characters of
the experiences. Moreover, hallucinations, which he takes to be percepts and therefore
should have recognitional characters in experience, do not have external causes and
therefore do not have recognitional characters in experience.41 The sharp distinction
between percepts and images also collapses in this sense.

2.2.5. On concurrent imagery
McGinn (2004) believes percepts can be accompanied by concurrent (and disparate)
imagery but it is not the case of images (p.77-79).42 He thinks that percepts and images
Recognitional characters are applicable to perceptual experiences only where there are external
corresponding references.
42
He thinks: percepts are not attention-dependent and therefore the mind can wander from its percepts
into forming a mental image; in contrast; images are attention-dependent and the mind cannot wander
from it from into forming another image. Therefore, we can form one image only at a time.
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do not compete with each other. They can take place at the same time “except in the
case in which they have the very same content”. This is an interesting point to discuss.
It is not absolutely clear whether percepts and images of the same content can take
place at the same time. If this is possible, such a case further supports the claim that
percepts and images fall on a continuum. When percepts and images of the same
content take place at the same time, can one tell whether it is percepts or images that
catch one’s attention? One may allude to different causal relations. Percepts are caused
by external stimuli and images are caused internally. However, such processes occur
simultaneously and it is difficult for the subject to differentiate between the two
processes. In this case, they may have quite inseparable experiential characters relative
to the subject.43 This shows that a sharp distinction between percepts and images is
misguided. McGinn defends his sharp distinction argument by implying that percepts
and images of the same content cannot coexist. In the case where percepts and images
have the same content, they may compete. Either percepts or images win. If percepts
win, percepts are attention-dependent and no concurrent image can be formed. This
contradicts his claim that percepts are not attention-dependent and a concurrent image
can be formed. If images win, it means that you can choose to attend to images and
refrain from perceiving. This contradicts his claim that percepts are passive and
uncontrollable. 44 Both ways collapse the sharp distinction between percepts and
images that he draws.

Gibson’s account of perception: when you inspect the object, if it reveals details or appears
differently with varying viewing positions, it is a percept. In that case, it is still possible to differentiate
between percepts and images, even if they have the same content, at least in principle. The question
arising will be: can percepts and images of the same content take place at the same time? The Perky
experiment (1910) shows that it is possible to mistakenly take percepts to be images with the same
content. The participants thought they were imagining but not perceiving. Can it be the case that they
were actually imagining and perceiving the same content at the same time? The answer is not obvious.
44
If percepts are uncontrollable, the subject cannot choose to refrain from perceiving a particular
content. More details in section 2.2.6.
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Moreover, it is questionable whether we can have one image only at a time, according
to the way he argues. He claims that only one image can be formed at a time because
it fully occupies our attention and involves effort. Voluntary imaginings may take up
full or explicit attention because effort is involved in producing such imaginings.
However, what about involuntary imaginings? When we do not actively put effort into
producing them and when they are unpleasant and therefore not welcome, is it
necessary to pay full or explicit attention to it? Can the subject make an effort to
imagine a nicer image and try to dismiss the unpleasant involuntary one? In doing so,
is it possible to have concurrent images? What about spontaneous imaginings without
the subject’s (conscious) effort in producing them? Can we have deliberate and
spontaneous images at the same time? It is not absolutely clear that whether it is
possible to have more than one image at the same time, according to the way he argues,
where he sticks to voluntary imaginings. For imaginings with the subject’s awareness
of the actual imagining state, it seems that it is hard to imagine a situation where more
than one image can be formed at the same time. However, it is unclear whether there
cannot be concurrent images, if we have lower-order imaginings where the subject
does not know the actual imagining state and therefore take the imaginings to be
percepts. To the subject, the imaginings are no different from percepts. In that case,
can the subject have more than one image at a time? In other words, can lower-order
imaginings and higher-order imaginings take place at the same time? The answers to
these questions are by no means obvious. Moreover, our imagination may be dynamic
and borderless. It is hard to judge what constitutes one image and what means by
concurrent images. Imagination is an internal and introspective process where the
ability to access the exact content is limited. We may never know whether we form
one image only at a time. Whether there is only one image at a time is not important
41

as I do not think it helps defend the sharp distinction or the imagination view of
dreaming.

2.2.6. Subjection to the will
Among the characteristics McGinn (2004) lists to sharply differentiate between
percepts and images, the only one that Ichikawa (2009) explicitly endorses is “subject
to the will”. I argue that “subjection to the will” arguments do not help draw the sharp
distinction and do not help defend the imagination view of dreaming.

Ichikawa thinks “the will” captures the key difference between percepts and images.
McGinn argues along the same lines with him. According to them, images involves a
process of actively doing, is subject to the will and therefore can be controlled while
percepts involves a process of passively receiving, are not subject to the will and
therefore cannot be controlled. Control plays an important role in their sharp
distinction.

Percepts as “passively receiving” is actually an old-fashioned view on perception. It
has been argued that perception is not as passive as assumed.45 Perception is an active
seeking-process to search for what one wants to perceive, to select among the
indefinitely large number of external objects and to select on which part of the scene
to focus. In that sense, one cannot deny that percepts are also subject to the will and
amenable to control, to a certain degree.

Ichikawa (2009) concedes we may still be able to exert control over what we perceive

45

Accounts on perception being active, see Gibson (1970), Thomas (2014).
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but the control can only be indirect, as opposed to direct control over images. Thomas
(2014) finds the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” control confusing. He
claims that one can just find ways to attend to what one wants to perceive. For instance,
if I want to see a cat, I can make an effort to find a cat and bring it in sight. When I see
a cat, I can choose to which part to attend, actively seeking to test whether what I seem
to see is really what I see.46

In addition, it is not the case that we can always control our imaginings. It is not
difficult to find examples of (spontaneous) involuntary imaginings in our daily life, for
example, an annoying tune or unpleasant images in head which we want to get rid of
but fail to do so. It seems that control is not a necessary condition of imaginings. This
forms the general challenge of the whole conception of imagination: If imagination is
subject to the will, it should be amenable to control. Why is there a gap between the
will and control (as in the examples of involuntary imaginings)?47 In that case, what
is the necessary condition of imaginings? Subjection to the will? How can we tell
whether something is subject to the will if we cannot control it? Ichikawa (2009)
argues that “the fact that sometimes we imagine things we’d rather not be imagining
does not show that imagining is not an action and subject to the will” because “we can
try to banish it; we know what it is to banish” (p.107). From these two sentences, it
makes sense to say Ichikawa takes subjection to the will to be a necessary condition

In my opinion, both percepts and images can be controlled, in terms of their contents, in a slightly
different sense though. They differ in terms of the subject’s ability to alter the content without any
adjustment of the perceptual organs. I can will to see but I cannot will to alter the content of what I see
without moving because percepts are caused by external stimuli and therefore the content of percepts is
bound by the external world. I cannot alter every bit of the content as I wish in my mind like what I can
do when I imagine. We control percepts in order to realize more information about the external world
while we do not control images in the same way. Images, caused internally, do not give us knowledge
about what the external world is like.
47
I do not attempt to provide an answer here, given the limited length of this thesis. Another project is
needed to find out the answer.
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of imaginings and he thinks self-awareness of the imagining state is the key to telling
whether something is subject to the will.48

Images are subject to the will.
How to tell whether something is an image? It is subject to the will.
How to tell whether something is subject to the will? Self-awareness of the imagining
state.49
This argument is not helpful in defending the claim that something is an image, when
it is not clear that whether it is an image. When you are not sure whether something is
an image, it is not convincing to say it is an image because you know it is. It is unclear
whether you really know it. Maybe it is just the case you think you know it. The claim
“I know it is an image” can be false. Moreover, it seems to threaten the reliability of
knowledge (if there is any) if we do not provide any reason to justify that claim but
simply say I know... We should provide reasons to justify this claim: how we come to
“know” it (if we really know it). For example, we “know” it is an image because of its
fictional content, sudden shift of scenes and amenability to control. This justification
process is absent in Ichikawa’s argument. He just jumps to the self-awareness of the
imagining state. This does not help defend that something (to be proved as an image)
is an image. The concept of the will is usually alluded to the self-awareness of the
imagining state. Such an argument does not help defend the imagination view of
dreaming as such self-awareness is absent in non-lucid dreaming.

This means the subject is aware that the process which generates such content is internal (where there
is no direct causal relation with external stimuli). That is a higher-order awareness which enables the
subject to know the actual state she is currently experiencing. This is an introspective process, which
can be unreliable.
49
That is the awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings-self-awareness of the imagining state.
It is not absolutely clear how the subject comes to be aware that it is an image. Ichikawa (2009)
comments “many of the characteristics McGinn lists as typical of images…are not clear cases of
essential qualities of images” (p.106). The only characteristic he explicitly endorses is “subject to the
will”.
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If we claim that dreams are images and subject to the will, the first challenge we may
face is: why we cannot control (non-lucid) dreams.

Control is not possible in non-lucid dreaming. Even if control is possible in lucid
dreaming, the extent of control is limited. This does not favour the imagination view
of dreaming.50

As shown above, it is not the case that we can always control images, even in awake
states. That shows that control is not a necessary condition of images and subjection
to the will. Using the absence of control or the limited extent of control to deny dreams
are images is not legitimate. However, it is justified to ask why dreams are images, if
we cannot control non-lucid dreams. This leads us to go back to the question of how
we can tell whether something is subject to the will if we cannot control it. Ichikawa’s
answer is irrelevant and does not help because the proclaimed self-awareness is absent
in non-lucid dreaming.

Then in what way are we justified in alleging that dreams are images?

McGinn (2004) is aware of the problem of non-lucid dreaming, where self-awareness
of the fact that one is in a dream state is absent. He writes,

“dreams do not appear to be subject to the will: we do not decide what to dream, but
instead occupy the role of passive recipient.” (ibid., p.88)

Windt (2015) claims that the ability to control the content is much repressed in lucid dreams than in
waking imaginings, which challenges the imagination view of dreaming.
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He goes on defending the imagination view of dreaming by trying to resolve the above
problem,

“It would be wrong to suppose that the sleeper is entirely passive, a complete nonagent; sleeping and acting are not incompatible. Thus we have sleepwalking and sleeptalking, adjustments of posture to avoid discomfort, small movements seemingly
correlated with the content of the dream.” (ibid., p.88-89)

Is it really useful to claim that the sleeper is active by quoting examples of bodily
behavior? Recall the previously mentioned claim made by McGinn and Ichikawa:
percepts are sharply differentiated from images in that percepts involve a process of
“passively receiving” while images involve a process of “actively doing”. The key role
that the notion of “actively doing” plays in the sharp distinction is: it involves effort in
producing and also the possibility of altering the content without any sense-organ
adjustment.51 The whole process is mental. Sticking to bodily behavior is not helpful
in arguing for such an “activeness” as the sense of bodily activeness is different from
the sense of mental activeness. Unless McGinn draws some relations between these
two senses and shows that bodily activeness can help argue for mental activeness, the
argument on behavior does not help argue that dreams are images.

Another way McGinn (2004) argues, trying to defend the imagination view of
dreaming:
“Since we could always declare subjection to the will not to be a necessary condition

I assume they will agree with me in my interpretation over the difference in control between percepts
and images.
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of image-hood. Maybe it holds for all waking images, but the images of sleep are
different; they are simply a species of image that cannot be voluntarily controlled.”
(P.88)

From the above quotation, there are three points to note. First, subjection to the will
not being a necessary condition of images means that there is at least one (kind of)
image that is not subject to the will. This collapses the sharp distinction he draws:
images are subject to the will while percepts are not. Second, when he claims that
dream images are different from awake-state images, is it still legitimate to use the
features of awake-state images to support the claim that dreams are images (like what
he and Ichikawa do) without bridging the gap in a proper way? Last but not least, he
holds that dream images cannot be voluntarily controlled. This is false and involves a
problem of overgeneralization. The kind of dreaming he is addressing in the above
quotation is non-lucid dreaming. There is also lucid dreaming, where the dream
content can be controlled.52 He does mention lucid dreaming somewhere.

“And there are also clear cases in which dreams can be subject to the will: we have all
had the experience of intentionally terminating a nightmare when it becomes too
emotionally intense, and the rarer phenomenon of ‘lucid dreams’ allows for voluntary
control over the full course of the dream.” (McGinn, 2004, P.89)

There are different degrees of lucidity in lucid dreams (Noreika et al., 2010). Lucid
dreams do not necessarily mean one can exert control over the full course of the dream.
Compared to waking (voluntary) images, the extent of control over the dream content

Lucid dreamers may still have difficulties controlling the dream content, but control is at least
possible.
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is limited. Lucid dreamers do not necessarily control every bit of the dream content as
they wish. Lucid dreams only entail that the dreamer is aware of the fact that he is in
a dream state.53 McGinn does not draw detailed relations between non-lucid dreaming
and lucid dreaming. He just mentions lucid dreaming as a rare phenomenon. That does
not help defend the imagination view of dreaming.

From the above quotation, he means:

Control entails subjection to the will.
Control is possible in lucid dreaming.
Dreaming can be subject to the will.

There is a problem in this argument. “Dreams can be subject to the will” does not mean
all dreams are subject to the will. It is unclear what kind of dreams are subject to the
will and what kind of dreams are not. It makes sense to say lucid dreams are subject to
the will. What about non-lucid dreams? Unclear. Nothing follows from this argument
over the question of whether non-lucid dreaming is subject to the will or not. In other
words, this argument does not show that all dreams are subject to the will and thus are
images. That does not help defend the imagination view of dreaming as non-lucid
dreams, which are the main challenge the imagination view of dreaming faces, are not
addressed in a proper way.

McGinn is mixing up the issue of control and subjection to the will. He should not
have put: 1. “we could always declare subjection to the will not to be a necessary

53

This is the general definition of lucid dreaming I endorse. For detail, see p. 12 of this thesis.
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condition of image-hood” and 2. “dreams can be subject to the will”. What follows
from 1 & 2: there exist images that are not subject to the will. The sharp distinction
between percepts and images collapses and it does not help resolve the problem. He
should have claimed that (successful) control is not a necessary condition of “imagehood” (what I argue above). He should maintain that all images are subject to will.
Otherwise, subjection to the will is not useful for him to draw a sharp distinction, to
defend the imagination view of dreaming and resolve the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem. 54 So far, the kind of images McGinn and Ichikawa
discuss are high-order images, namely what they call awake-state images, where the
subject is aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state. It is unclear whether there
exists any image which is not subject to the will and whether there is any image that
is not amenable to control. I personally think there is none. Images are caused
internally. Given this nature, images should be amenable to control. We may fail to
control it but its nature should grant its amenability to control. Can we exert control
(alter the content without any sense-organ adjustment) on something which is not
subject to the will? So far I have not been able to think of any example. I hold that
control (over the content without any adjustment of the sense-organs) is not a necessary
but a sufficient condition of subjection to the will and subjection to the will is a
necessary condition of the so-called “image-hood”.55 For involuntary images, they are
still subject to the will and therefore amenable to control. It is just the attempt to control
is somehow unsuccessful.56

If all images are subject to the will, they are amenable to control (but no successful control is
guaranteed). In other words, control is possible. That can explain why something which does not appear
to be subject to the will can be controlled, as in dreaming. If not all images are subject to the will, there
is difficulty bridging the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming and it is difficult to defend
the imagination view of dreaming and resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.
55
The term “image-hood” is used by McGinn. It means perceptual imaginings here.
56
This helps defend the imagination view of dreaming. For details, see chapter 3.
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Although many of his arguments are fallacious (as shown above), McGinn is very
devoted to explaining the dreaming phenomenon. As a closing of this part, let us see
how he explains the absence of one’s awareness of his own dream state.

2.2.6.1. “Psychic split”
McGinn uses a psychological concept to explain non-lucid dreaming: psychic split. He
divides the self into an author-self and an audience-self, trying to explain why
dreamers are not aware of their dream states. The author self is the hidden agent
producing the dream and the audience-self is unaware of such an agent and receives
what is given to her by the author self. He uses this concept to claim that “dream
images are the product of an unconscious will. If that is so, then dream images are not
counterexamples to the necessary condition of subjection to the will. All images are
subject to the will, after all, but this may not be apparent to the consciousness of their
recipient.” (McGinn, 2004, P.90).

First, the audience metaphor is not entirely convincing. “Audience” implies that the
subject is aware of the “stage”. If I watch a play, I know the actors are performing. I
can tell the fictional events are not real events happening and as a result will not believe
the fictional events. However, this is not the case of non-lucid dreamers. They are not
aware of the fact that they are in a dream state and believe the dream events. The gap
between non-lucid dreamers and the audience metaphor remains unfilled. The
audience metaphor is more akin to lucid dreaming where the subject is aware of the
fact that she is in a dream state and does not believe the dream events. He claims nonlucid dreamers are fully immersed audiences who believe the dream events. Why this
is so is unclear. The gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming is not bridged.
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The psychic split does not directly show that dreams are subject to the will in any
obvious way. He needs to elucidate why “dream images are products of an unconscious
will”, namely to prove why dreams are subject to the will. Just suggesting the psychic
split but not relating it to lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming accordingly does not
help defend that dreams are images. He should address both lucid and non-lucid
dreaming and draw the connection between them in order to argue that dreams are
products of imagination.

The use of the psychic split is along the same lines of the Freudian approach. But
McGinn (2004) does not agree with Freud in the question of why there is such a
psychic split:

“Why is there such a psychic split? Freud’s answer is that it is because the unconscious
contains dark and dangerous desires that must be repressed for the stability of the entire
psyche.” (p.91)

He does not endorse such a negative account of human nature.

“It is not that we are afraid of the unconscious, as Freud would have it; rather, we have
an urge to believe what we merely fantasize.” (ibid., p.92)

He tries to provide his own answer to that question.

“I conjecture, then, that the psychic split occurs in order to pave the way for dream
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belief and its associated emotions. For some reason, we have a need to believe during
the dream, and this requires the illusion of passivity. Why this is so I am not sure, but
it does seem to be the case” (ibid., p.91)

His answer does not really answer the question. Paving way for dream belief is not
exactly why the psychic split occurs. Rather, it is how the psychic split occurs or can
be like. The underlying reason for the occurrence of the psychic split remains
unanswered. This may be the key element to bridge lucid dreaming and non-lucid
dreaming, which helps defend the imagination view of dreaming. This most important
part is omitted and his account is incomplete. He should try to provide an answer in
order to make his account complete and plausible, so as to favour the imagination view
of dreaming. If this is not done, the psychic split will only be an ad hoc argument which
fails to explain non-lucid dreaming and disfavor the imagination view of dreaming.

3. Concluding remarks
Let us recall how the sharp distinction between percepts and images should work, in
order to help resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem:

From the sharp distinction between percepts and images to that between percepts and
dreams:
P1) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and images.
P2) Dreams involve images but not percepts.
C) Therefore, there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams.

Using the sharp distinction between percepts and dreams to resolve the awake52

dreaming indistinguishability problem:
P1*) If there is a sharp distinction between two states, the subject can distinguish
between them and tell which state they are currently in.
P2*) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams.
P3*) If there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams, there is a sharp
distinction between awake states and dream states.
P4*) There is a sharp distinction between awake states and dream states. (modus
ponens, P3*&P2*)
C*) Thus, the subject can distinguish between awake states and dream states and
tell which state they are currently in. (modus ponens, P4*&P1*)

The sharp distinction between percepts and dreams means there is at least one
fundamental difference between percepts and dreams. If there is a fundamental
difference between percepts and dreams, the subject should be able to distinguish
between them and tell whether she is in an awake state or dream state. This points out
that these two kinds of states are not fundamentally indistinguishable, which resolve
the epistemological aspect of the problem. It shows that P1 of both A1 and A2 are false.
After resolving the problem, the subject should be able to come to be aware of the fact
that she is in an awake state when she is awake; she should also be able to come to be
aware of the fact that she is in a dream state when she is dreaming. However, the sharp
distinction fails because of the following reasons:

(a) McGinn and Ichikawa take hallucinations to be percepts.
(b) Their arguments stick to higher-order images (with the subject’s selfawareness of the imagining state).
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What follows from (a) and (b):
(a) collapses the sharp distinction between percepts and images and therefore the sharp
distinction between percepts and dreams. If P1 is false, the argument is unsound and it
does not follow that C is true. It does not follow that P2* is true and C* is true either.
The sharp distinction no longer helps resolve the problem: it can collapse neither A1
nor A2 and it fails to resolve any aspect of the problem. The salient point of collapsing
A1 and A2 is to restore the reliability of perceptual knowledge. If hallucinations are
percepts, this means hallucinations and percepts have (subjectively) indistinguishable
phenomenal characters. In that case, the subject cannot be sure what kind of experience
their beliefs are derived from and it is very likely she forms a mistaken judgment over
what are percepts and what are hallucinations. The epistemic threat (brought by both
A1 & A2) persists. It poses a further epistemic threat: even if the subject is aware of
the fact that she is awake, it is very likely that she forms mistaken judgments and no
perceptual knowledge results. It is misguided to take hallucinations to be percepts. It
just worsens the problem.

The sharp distinction is made with reference to awake-state images with the subject’s
self-awareness of the imagining state. The self-awareness of the imagining state, what
I call the awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings makes the arguments
inapplicable to non-lucid dreaming and is not helpful in accounting for non-lucid
dreaming. (b) is not helpful in arguing that dreams are images because such selfawareness is absent in non-lucid dreaming. It does not follow that P2 is true and it does
not follow that C is true. In that case, it does not follow P2* and C* are true either. It
cannot show A1 and A2 are unsound. It fails to resolve any aspect of the problem either.
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To conclude, the sharp distinction drawn by McGinn and Ichikawa is misguided, is not
helpful in defending the imagination view of dreaming and fails to resolve the awakedreaming indistinguishability problem.
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B) The Denial of Belief in Dreams
In this part, I evaluate another main approach of the imagination view of dreaming,
the denial of belief in dreams, adopted by Ichikawa and Sosa, to see if it can help
resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. Both Ichikawa (2009) and
Sosa (2005) think we have a lot of beliefs in dreams but we do not actually believe
what we dream: we believe that p in our dreams but do not actually believe that p while
we dream.57 They deny that dream beliefs are beliefs. First, in terms of terminological
concern, “dream belief” literally implies belief. If Ichikawa and Sosa do not think
dream beliefs are beliefs, they should avoid using the term “dream belief”, which is a
cause of conceptual confusion. Second, the distinction between “in one’s dream” and
“while one dreams” or “in fact” implies that perceptual experiences are while dream
experiences are not actual experiences. This involves an awake-state stereotyped
conception of belief as being perceptual and functional, which hinders a fair study of
the dream experience and dream beliefs. Third, the denial of belief in dreams is an ad
hoc approach and does not help resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability
problem.

1. The reasons for Ichikawa and Sosa to deny belief in dreams:
1.1.The functional role of belief
The main reason for Ichikawa (2009) and Sosa (2005) to deny belief in dreams is due
to the functional role of belief: belief involves a functional role which is “connected
with perceptual experiences” and “motivates action” (Ichikawa, 2009, p. 114).
According to their argument, the functional role of belief is closely connected to action
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Sosa (2005) distinguishes between “in one’s dream” and “while one dreams” (p. 8). Ichikawa (2009)

argues along the same line, differentiating between “in the dream” and “in fact” (p.111).
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or behavior. For example, if I believe I am chased by a lion, I will keep running (away
from it) (Sosa, 2005, p. 8). This is the functional role of typical perceptual beliefs,
which govern our action by giving an appropriate response to the signals we get from
experiences. One of the reasons that they deny belief in dreams is: dreamers do not act
according to their dream content, based on observation (Ichikawa, 2009, p. 115).
Observation plays an important role in Ichikawa and Sosa’s argument, which implies
that belief can be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior. However, can all
beliefs be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior? If there are beliefs which
cannot be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior, it is not legitimate to deny
that beliefs occur in dreams due to the the lack of observable action or bodily behavior
generally in sleep.

1.1.1. Can all beliefs be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior?
Imagine a case: Sarah has been kept in a closet since birth. She has never come out to
interact with the world. She learns about how people react to different stimuli, namely
how people feel and what they do in different situations, on books. For instance, if a
person thinks he is about to be stabbed, he will fear and try to escape. When he is
stabbed, the person will feel great pain. If a person feels great pain, his face will
grimace, he will collapse, and so on. Sarah has no idea about what fear and pain feel
like. Now she has a chance to come out of the closet and interact with the world. She
happens to be stabbed by a psychopath. Before she is stabbed, she does not feel
anything different from how she felt in the closet. After she is stabbed, she keeps
bleeding, but still she does not feel anything different from how she felt in the closet.
In other words, she cannot feel fear and pain. She remains still, doing nothing. People
around her look at her with questioning eyes. She has learnt that her response to such
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an experience is deviated from the norms and she is thought to be weird or even “a
monster”. In order to survive within the social circle, she has to hide the fact that she
does not feel fear and pain. Next time when she is about to be stabbed, she pretends
she feels fear and tries to escape. When she is stabbed, she pretends she feels pain by
screaming with a grimaced face and collapsing, not in pain but in pretense of being in
pain. People think she believes being stabbed is a fearsome and painful experience,
but in fact she does not. This is a case of pretense, which shows that action does not
always carry a corresponding belief we anticipate and it is possible that we cannot infer
belief from action.

The very same action can carry a different belief or different beliefs. Let us consider a
case where a man kills his wife: Man a may kill his wife because he believes his wife
betrays him; Man b may kill his wife because he believes it is better for his wife to die,
for her own good (for example, she is suffering a severe chronic disease which puts
her in great pain every day); Man c may kill his wife because he believes she is
possessed by an evil spirit which wants to kill him; Man d may kill his wife because
he believes his wife betrays him and he can get a lot of money from the insurance
company if his wife is dead, et cetera, et cetera. It is unlikely to be possible to draw a
complete list of beliefs that one action shows. There can be a wide variety of different
beliefs behind the very same action among different people. There can be more than
one belief behind a particular action within the same subject. There can be a lot of
completely different situations in which one does a particular action. If we do not any
have background information of the subject, it can be hard to find out the belief or
beliefs behind that action. The action itself does not necessarily tell what belief(s) the
subject holds.
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Moreover, it is unlikely we are always right about what actions follow from a belief if
we do not have the background information of the subject.
Consider a case: Sharon and Sally are twins. They do not grow up together. Sharon is
raised in Angel Village while Sally is raised in Devil Village. The tradition of Angel
Village is to treat good people with love and care while that of Devil Village is to torture
good people. If Sharon and Sally believe that there is a good person in front of them,
Sharon will treat him well while Sally will torture him. This case shows that the very
same belief may yield completely different actions. What action follows from a belief
may vary among different cultures, living environments and values, and these factors
may vary with time. It is unlikely that there is only one (kind of) action following a
belief. Thus, a belief does not entail a particular action or an action profile. It is also
unlikely to make a list of actions as a complete set of a necessary condition of a belief
(belief p  action x, y, z…) or as a complete set of necessary conditions of a belief
(belief p action x or y or z…), given the diversities of factors affecting action.58 It is
unlikely to be possible to draw a complete list which applies to all times, cultures,
living environments and values. If we do not know about the background information
of the subject, his response to a particular belief (in the form of action) can be
unpredictable.
Moreover, degrees of belief might shift and it is possible that there are actions
conflicting with professed beliefs (Rowbottom, 2016). It further shows that it seems to
be impossible to draw a complete list of actions following from a particular belief.
It is not true that we can always infer belief by observing one’s action. There are some
If there are a set of actions as a necessary condition of a belief, it means that the occurrence of such
a belief has to be accompanied by all actions included in the set. The list of actions as a complete set of
a necessary condition of a belief (belief x  action x, y, z…) is even less probable due to the
implausibility of manifesting one belief in the form of all actions (on the list) together at the same time
within the same subject.
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beliefs which cannot be inferred by observing one’s manifest action or behavior. It is
neither true that we can always anticipate particular action(s) following a belief. This
shows that it is misguided to deny belief in a particular experience (for example,
dreaming) because corresponding action cannot be observed.

1.2. Belief and fact
Another reason for Sosa and Ichikawa to deny belief in dreams is that dream events
are not actual events (facts) and therefore dream beliefs are not actual beliefs.

“Even if in my dream I believe that a lion is after me…in actuality I have no such
belief…From the fact that in my dream I am chased by a lion it does not follow that
while I dream I am chased.” (Sosa, 2005, p. 8)

“In my dream, I have many beliefs: in my dream, I believe that I am holding the
kitten…This alone does not entail beliefs; all parties grant that in the dream I believe
these things; in dispute is whether in fact I believe them… Compare: in the dream I
am holding a kitten; it does not follow that in fact I am doing so.” (Ichikawa, 2009, p.
111)

From the above quotations, we can see that Sosa and Ichikawa draw a close connection
between events and beliefs. They use the radical difference between dream events and
actual events to help impose a radical difference between dream beliefs and actual
beliefs and thus deny that dream beliefs are beliefs. Denying that dream beliefs are
beliefs due to the reason that dream events are not actual events (facts) is not legitimate.
What misunderstanding may follow from this approach: there are beliefs in actual
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events only. It may imply an undesirable outcome: drawing too close a connection
between belief and fact. This sets an unnecessarily high standard for belief. Fact, by
its very meaning, is always true. However, this is not the case of belief.59 Obviously
we can form false beliefs. When do we form false beliefs? We form false beliefs when
we do not know they are false, under two kinds of circumstances: 1) the subject fails
to attend to the evidence which tells they are forming false beliefs, 2) when there is no
evidence for us to judge whether our beliefs are true or false.60 Let us focus on the first
kind of circumstances first. Under this kind of circumstances, there is evidence
available to the subject which tells them that they are holding false beliefs. One may
wonder why the subject still forms false beliefs in this case. This kind of circumstances
illustrate cases where the subject is not in a rational state and fails to attend to the
evidence, as in the case of patients with mental disorders. For example, schizophrenic
patients cannot tell what is really happening and what is hallucination or imagination,
when they are overcome by the disorder. There are clues to tell whether the content is
a hallucination or a percept but they are just not aware of the clues.61 They form false
beliefs regarding what the world is like.

Now let us look at the second kind of circumstances where one forms false beliefs.
Consider a case of limited experiential evidence available: If we are a brain in a vat
and doomed to be deceived by an evil scientist, we form false beliefs about what the
external world is like. In fact, all beliefs regarding what the external world is like are
false because the experiential evidence available for us to form beliefs is all provided
by the scientist who blocks out all evidence which tells that we are in a virtual reality
Beliefs are required to be true when they are building blocks of knowledge. (I argue in ch. 2a that
this is a necessary condition of knowledge.) However, beliefs themselves are not necessarily true.
60
If we know they are false, we will not hold them anymore. That is what a rational subject should do.
61
Percepts and hallucinations (or imagination) can be differentiated by sense-organ adjustment. More
detail in ch. 2a.
61
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and forming false beliefs. Although we are rational and intend to find out the truths
about our environment, we fail because we have no access to the evidence which tells
the truth.

The above examples show that we may form false beliefs and beliefs are not truthbased. Moreover, we can form beliefs with content which is hard to know whether it
is true or false. There are a lot of things we do not or cannot know, for example,
whether there are ghosts, aliens, and ufos, to name but a few. We can still believe in
the existence of those things. Belief is not necessarily based on what we know. We can
form false beliefs, and beliefs which are hard to (we do not) know to be true or false.
It is misguided to allude belief to facts and use that as a reason deny that dream beliefs
are beliefs.

1.3.Inconsistency between long standing beliefs (knowledge) and dream beliefs
Both Sosa and Ichikawa think if dream beliefs are beliefs, there will be inconsistencies
between long standing beliefs (those held during awake states) and dream beliefs,
which does not make sense. For example, I hold the belief that pigs do not fly in awake
states but I may dream that pigs fly in dream states. If dream beliefs are beliefs, our
knowledge system will be threatened because of the epistemic irrationality of holding
p and not-p at the same time. The trick here lies at “at the same time”. If we do not
hold p and not-p at the same time, can we avoid the epistemic threat? How about this
approach: long standing beliefs are temporarily suspended during the dream period?
In that case, it is not the case that we hold both p and not-p at the same time and there
is no inconsistency between long standing beliefs and dream beliefs. Ichikawa does
not find this explanation appealing. He thinks that “we do not typically revise our
62

beliefs drastically and wholesale” (Ichikawa, 2009, p.112). Sosa thinks along the same
lines. He thinks that our beliefs do not necessarily rise to our consciousness at every
moment. He calls beliefs which do not come to our consciousness “latent beliefs”.
Although those beliefs are in storage, not rising to consciousness, they are not lost
during sleep and the dream period. Normally we do not need to revise our belief system
with conscious effort. When the dreaming subject form (dream) beliefs which are
obviously inconsistent with those long-standing beliefs, she should be able to note it
and dispel those (dream) beliefs. Otherwise, it is a kind of epistemic irrationality,
which is a cause of epistemic threat and not preferred.

The way they construe the threat is misguided. They stick to the awake-state
stereotyped conception of belief as being functional and perceptual and interpret dream
beliefs in the form of perceptual beliefs, which are usually the building blocks of
knowledge. If dream beliefs are building blocks of knowledge, they will pose a great
epistemic threat to our knowledge system. However, I argue that this is not the case. I
will show that dream beliefs are not building blocks of knowledge and do not threaten
perceptual knowledge. Even if the subject believes the content of imagination, there is
not necessarily an epistemic threat, or a pressing threat. In order avoid confusion, I
interpret dream belief in the form of “I believe that I imagine that p”,62 rather than “I
believe that p” (interpreted by Sosa and Ichikawa), in order to show dream beliefs do
not cause as pressing an epistemic threat as Sosa and Ichikawa think.

For any perceptual belief “I believe that p”, the truth value of p determines the truth

Note that “S believes that she imagines that p” can be different from “S imagines that p”. The latter
does not necessarily involve the subject’s reflective awareness of the fact that she is in an imagining
state while the former does. For the latter case, the subject may form mistaken judgment about her
current state and form false beliefs as a result.
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value of the belief: if p is true, the belief or the claim is true; if p is false, the belief or
the claim is false. However, this is not the case of the claim “I believe that I imagine
that p”. Here p is the content of imagination and should not be taken to be information
about the external world. If p is a proposition about what the external world is like, its
truth value lies in an external sense, which is irrelevant to imagination.63 The truth
value of p does not determine the truth value of the claim “I imagine that p” and
therefore it does not determine the truth value of the claim “I believe that I imagine
that p”.64 Moreover, I may not know what I imagine introspectively.65 However, that
does not pose a threat to the reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external
world looks like, as long as we can know we are imagining when we are really so.

One key advantage of my approach is that it can account for the emotional response of
the dreaming subject and does not threaten the reliability of general perceptual
knowledge about the external world. In the dream case, the subject can be aware or
unaware of the dream or imagining state.66 In lucid dreaming, the subject believes that
she imagines that p while in non-lucid dreaming, it can be said that the subject
imagines that p without being aware of the fact that she is imagining. Generally
speaking, if the subject is aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state (provided
that she is rational), she is aware that such a belief is not a building block of knowledge
about the external world. If the subject is unaware of the imagining state, she is
Imagination is a wholly internal process. It does not have any direct causal relation with the external
world.
64
Consider the proposition that pigs fly. This proposition is false, but it does not follow that I cannot
imagine that pigs fly.
65
There seems to be no way of finding the exact content of imagination. Scientific data can at most tell
whether we are in an imagining state or not but the content of imagination seems to rely on our
subjective interpretation. There seems to be no correctness but only plausible explanation over what we
imagine. It is questionable whether the content of imagination fits the criteria of knowledge, given the
uncertainty of mental content. Even if there is, I doubt whether the whole justificatory process can be
done introspectively, for introspection can be unreliable.
66
My account here involves an assumption of taking dreams to be imaginings. I will show why we
should take dreams to be imaginings in chapter 3
64
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unaware that such a belief is not a building block of knowledge and may form a
mistaken judgment. In this case, she may have a stronger emotional response towards
the dream events. The subject may be unaware of the difference between p and
imagining that p. She may think she is believing p but in fact, she is imagining p
without being aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state. One may worry if this
causes a pressing epistemic threat. I argue that this is not the case. Non-lucid dreaming
does not pose a threat to the general knowledge system, as the subject can be aware of
the fact that she is imagining or dreaming.67

It is reasonable to ask why the subject is unaware of the imagining state, as in the case
of schizophrenia. The answer is that mental disorders strip them of their rationality.
How about the dream case? Why is the same person rational during awake states but
irrational during dream states?

Does it makes sense? I am not giving a detailed

explanation (which I attempt to provide in chapter three) here. The salient point here
is that such an approach-“I believe that I imagine that p” in dreams- does not cause a
threat to perceptual knowledge and it is possible to resolve the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem.

The way Sosa and Ichikawa construe this argument, contains obviously inconsistent
beliefs, for example, “pigs do not fly” (long-standing belief) and “pigs fly” (dream
belief). “Pigs do not fly” is a general or universal fact which rational people should be
able to acknowledge. As pigs do not fly, the belief that pigs fly should be dispelled,
rationally speaking. A general or universal fact is true any time (sticking to the current
world we are living where it is true), independent of the subject’s state. However, we
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For detail, see chapter 3.
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do not always dream about content which is inconsistent with general or universal facts.
For example, if we dream about getting up from bed and getting ready for school, is
there any belief inconsistency?68 Sosa will say yes: I cannot be in bed and getting up
preparing for school at the same time. However, unlike general facts, the belief that I
am in bed is not always true. Whether it is true or not depends on my state: when I am
in bed, it is true; when I am not, it is false. When I am asleep having a false awakening
dream, I may easily dispel the belief that I am in bed, for it is not always true. This
kind of belief which is relative to the subject’s state shows that it is not belief
inconsistency that essentially points out the problem. Rather, the problem lies at the
subject’s being unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state. Such unawareness does
not necessarily result in inconsistent beliefs which cause a serious epistemic threat
claimed by Sosa and Ichikawa. It is misguided to interpret dream beliefs in the form
of perceptual beliefs regarding general or universal facts and construe a pressing
epistemic threat in the form of inconsistency between long-standing beliefs and dream
beliefs.

1.4. Moral responsibility
Ichikawa and Sosa draw a close connection between belief and intention.69 They think
that while dreaming, the subject does not really intend and she is “not responsible in
the slightest” (Sosa, 2005, p.10; Ichikawa, 2009, p.113). They suppose that denying
moral responsibility in dreams helps defend the denial of belief in dreams, which I
show to be misguided. According to their argument, intention is the key to judging
whether one is morally responsible. However, the main reason for denying moral
It refers to inconsistency between long-standing beliefs (facts in particular) and dream beliefs.
This is due to the functional profile they ascribe to belief and intention. Ichikawa (2009) claims that
belief and intention “seem to be on a par”: denying one while affirming the other "seems ad hoc” (p.113).
Therefore, they believe the denial of intention and moral responsibility is helpful in the denial of belief
in dreams.
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responsibility is that the subject needs not do what she dreams in actuality (ibid.). This
leads us to think whether it is action or intention that is the underlying factor we need
to consider while making moral judgment.

First, intention is a mental concept and does not necessarily entail action. I can intend
to do something but fail to do so for some reason. Observing one’s action is not
sufficient for making a full moral judgment. Consider a case: William was raised by
his mother in a single-parent family. His mother always abused him in his childhood.
He understands it was extremely difficult for his mother to raise a child on her own
and does not want to blame her. He wants to give her a better life, as a gratitude to her
for raising him in difficult circumstances. However, he has also formed hatred towards
her and sometimes blames her for the traumatic memories of childhood abuse which
still have negative impacts on his life now. Sometimes he intends to give his mother a
better life but sometimes he also intends to torture and kill her. Every time when he
intends to torture or kill her, he is stopped from doing so by his intention to protect his
mother. He never succeeds in torturing and killing his mother but he does intend so
sometimes. No one knows of such an intention except himself. What people (including
William’s mother) see is William treating his mother so well. It shows that observing
one’s action is not sufficient for making a full moral judgment, for some action may
not be observed. The action carried out will show the intention directing that action,
but it is not essential or adequate for making a full moral judgment. For example, if
people see William treating his mother so well, they may think he is praiseworthy.
However, they do not know his evil intention of torturing and killing his mother, which
is to blame. Intention does not necessarily entail action: I can intend to do x but fail to
do x. Imagine another case: Sam has a strong desire to murder. He is watched by an
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agent. Whenever he intends to kill, the agent stops him from acting in the very
beginning. He never kills but always intends to kill. Isn’t he blameworthy?

It is not the case that we can always infer intention from observing one’s action and
make a full moral judgment based on observing one’s action: I can intend to do
something but fail to do so; the fact that that I do something does not entail I intend to
do as such. I have already given examples to show the former case. Now I give an
example to illustrate the latter case. Imagine that Alan is controlled by an evil demon.
He is made to kill his beloved wife. He does not intend so at all. He loves his wife so
much and does not want to see his wife die, but he just cannot control his body. Alan
is made to pick up a gun and shoot his beloved wife, against his will. The killing action
does not necessarily show a killing intention. I think it makes sense to say the evil
demon, rather than Alan, is the one to blame. Now we see that action and intention do
not bear any inseparable relation. If we grant that intention is the key factor to be
considered while making moral judgment, there is a problem: sometimes it can be hard
to judge whether one has a particular intention, given the uncertainty of mental
content.70
Sosa also agrees that observing one’s action is not sufficient for making (a full) moral
judgment. He claims that if your body is paralyzed and cannot carry out your evil plan,
you are still to blame (Sosa, 2005, p.9). It makes sense to say intention itself,
independent of action, is the cause of blame, according to Sosa’s argument. If a brutal
killer is paralyzed and cannot kill, he is blameworthy if he still has the intention to kill.
He may imagine how to torture and kill but cannot implement his plans due to physical

Sometimes mental content may not be accessible to us, just like we may not know what we imagine.
It is also questionable whether we know what we intend.
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constraints.71 According to Sosa’s argument, he is blameworthy for the content of his
intended plan or imagination. Now that killer receives some kind of hypnosis treatment
where he does not consciously imagine anything evil. His evil desires or intentions are
deeply buried under his consciousness. When he is awake, he unknowingly suppresses
those desires. When he falls into sleep, such ability to suppress the evil desires ceases
to work. Those evil imaginings arise again in his dreams. In his dreams, he imagines
exactly the same way he did before the hypnosis treatment. Now is he blameworthy?
If it is the content of intention or imagination that is morally responsible, I do not see
any reason why he is not morally responsible in dream states. Those desires are always
there. They are just suppressed during awake states. His evil intention or imagination
just moves from awake states to dream states. If he is to blame during awake states
(before the hypnosis treatment), I do not see any reason why he is not blameworthy in
dream states, given the content of intention is exactly the same.

Sosa says that whatever the dream content is, the dreamer is not morally responsible.
However, if he grants that dreams are products of imagination, the above case is at
least in principle possible.72 In that case, the dreamer is blameworthy for the dream
content. He claims that there is a difference between the dreamer and the dream
content- we may blame the storyteller for telling such a story but we do not blame the
dream characters for what they do in the dream (Sosa, 2005, p. 9). Is such a difference
of much value, in terms of moral responsibility? I do not think so. If dreams are
products of imagination and the author is the dreamer, what the dream characters do is

In this case, there is no significant difference between intention and imagination. It makes sense to
say the paralyzed killer imagines or intends the evil plans to be carried out, due to the inability to carry
out the plans.
72
I am not trying to say dreams are carriers of one’s intention. I just want to point out that if there are
cases where the border between intention and imagination is blurred, it is misguided to set up a sharp
distinction between intention and imagination and deny moral responsibility in the latter.
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all designed by the dreaming subject. If intention, which is mental and independent of
action, is the key factor in judging whether someone is morally responsible and it is
possible that it cannot be differentiated from imagination, one cannot deny that the
dreamer can be morally responsible for the dream content to a certain degree. We do
not blame the dream characters do for what they do in the dream but do blame the
dreamer for what she dreams about, namely what the dream characters do in the dream,
if we apply the concept of moral responsibility to dreaming. Simply claiming that the
subject does not really intend in dreams and therefore is not morally responsible is ad
hoc. The limited access to mental content calls into question that whether we really
know we intend or not. Sometimes the border between imagination and intention is
blurred, as shown in the above case of the paralyzed killer. It is by no means
uncontroversial to deny moral responsibility in dreams, if we take dreams to be
products of imagination. Denying intention and moral responsibility in dreams does
not help argue for the denial of belief in dreams or the imagination view of dreaming.

2. Can the denial of belief in dreams resolve the awake-dreaming
indistinguishability problem?
2.1. The epistemological aspect of the problem
The key to resolving this aspect of the problem is to show that awake states and dream
states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. Sosa argues that we always know we
are in an awake state when we are really so. He says awake states can be automatically
affirmed by questioning whether I am awake: if I think, I am awake. This, if true, can
resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem and collapse A1.

To start with, Sosa (2005) use an analogy between death and dreaming to show that
dreams are not a cause of epistemic threat (p. 12). He claims that both death and
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dreaming are unconscious states. Unconscious states do not threaten knowledge of
conscious states, for the subject is unable to tell she is unconscious when she is
unconscious. The subject is able to question whether he is conscious only if he is
conscious. If he asks whether he is conscious (awake), he must be conscious (awake).
The judgment that one is conscious (awake) cannot be mistaken. He thinks dreams are
like death and do not cause epistemic threat. This is not so convincing as there is a
significant difference between death and dreaming: a dead person is unconscious but
a dreaming subject is not unconscious, at least not unconscious in the same sense as a
dead person. A dead body is not working anymore. It cannot receive any external
signals. It cannot generate any internal signals either. It is unconscious in any sense.
However, that is not the case of dreaming. The body of a dreaming subject is working,
at a minimal level though.73 It still receives external signals, even though it does not
actively interpret the signals in the same way as it does during awake states. More
importantly, there are internal signals.74 If you take consciousness to be the ability of
actively interpreting external signals or even having perceptual experiences, then you
may say the dreaming subject is unconscious. If you allow consciousness to be the
ability to be aware of the internal signals in a particular sense, then the dreaming
subject can be said to be conscious.75 Whether the dreaming subject is conscious or
not may be a matter of terminological concern here, but the difference between a dead
person and a dreaming subject is more than a terminological concern. A dead person
does not pose any epistemic threat but a dreaming subject can.76 As a dead body is not
working physiologically or mentally, it is uncontroversial to say a dead body does not

For details, see chapter 2a.
This is shown by the working of the body to sustain life such as heartbeat. The occurrence of
dreaming further shows internal signals are generated.
75
For example, the subject is conscious of the dream state in lucid dreaming. The subject can also be
said to be conscious of the dream content in non-lucid dreaming, just with some mistaken judgment.
76
In principle, A2 poses an epistemic threat.
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hold any belief. However, that is not the case of a dreaming subject, whose body is
working both physiologically and mentally. Belief is a mental concept. It is not
uncontroversial to claim the dreaming subject holds or does not hold any belief. It
makes sense to raise the question of whether I am in a dream state or not,77 but it does
not make sense to ask whether I am dead or not, for the state in question itself shows
or alludes to the inability to ask such a question.

Ichikawa (2008) also thinks there are some important features of dreaming which
distinguish it from death: First, dreaming is an experience but death is not. Dreaming
is an experience where “there is something it is like to dream”. Second, dreaming is
“in an important way” similar to being awake in terms of sensation and belief.
Dreaming, comprising imagery and propositional imagination, plays some roles of
visual sensory experiences. The considerable similarity between awake states and
dream states makes it sensible to worry whether I am currently being awake or
dreaming but the insufficient similarity between awake states and death does not
ground such worry. One cannot affirm one is awake just by reflection ignoring the
possibility of making a false judgment (ibid., pp.522-523)

Ichikawa uses an example to illustrate that:

“Rip sleeps, and dreams, twenty hours out of every day. His dreams are very
compelling: upon waking, he is invariably surprised to learn that the events of his
dream were not actually occurring. Sometimes, when he is awake, he reflects on how
Sosa (2005) thinks that does not pose a threat as the dreaming subject does not really wonder whether
she is dreaming or not. Rather, she just dreams she is wondering. This is ad hoc. Wondering is a mental
process and it can be consistent with dreaming. In other words, the dreaming subject can wonder
whether she is dreaming or not, in principle. It is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between
dreaming and wondering and exclude the possibility of wondering in dreams.
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often things turn out to be just dreams, and he wonders whether his current experiences
are dream experiences; he sees no way to tell, other than to wait and see whether he
eventually wakes up.”

(Ibid., p. 522)

Ichikawa uses this example to show that if awake states and dream states are
fundamentally indistinguishable (as illustrated in the example), the subject cannot
distinguish between them. When there is no way to tell the difference between these
two kinds of states, clearly reflection does not help the subject correctly judge the
current state she is in. In the above case, Rip just happens to have true beliefs about
his current state. They are not formed on a well-justified basis from the experiential
evidence because there is no evidence marking any difference. It is an ad hoc approach
to claim that the judgment of awake states by reflection cannot be wrong and Rip is
“safe from the dream scenario”. This is not sufficient to grant knowledge and dispel
the epistemic threat.

Under what circumstances can one tell she is in an awake state? According to what I
argue in chapter one, there has to be at least one significant difference between awake
states and dream states which the subject is able to discern (with the assumption that
she is rational). In other words, they do not have (fundamentally) indistinguishable
experiential characters, namely identical (experiential) content. Otherwise, they are
fundamentally indistinguishable and one cannot tell she is in an awake state on a welljustified basis from the experiential evidence. Sosa holds a different view. He thinks
even if awake states and dream states have identical content, the subject can tell he is
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in an awake state when he is really so. If that is true, even in the case of brain-in-a-vat
where the super computer can generate experiences that have identical experiential
content as that of perceptual ones78, the subject can still differentiate between those
experiences (dream states and awake states) and tell he is awake when he is really so
(assuming it is possible for the brain-in-a-vat subject to be awake). That is not
convincing to me. When there is nothing the subject can discern, it is impossible in
principle for him to distinguish between awake states and dream states on a welljustified basis. Recall that knowledge is undefeated true justified belief. Reflective
knowledge refers to the knowledge of one’s current state based on available
experiential evidence, which is only possible when there is a discernible difference
between these two kinds of states to the subject and the subject is aware of the
difference, plus the ability to tell which state she is in on a well-justified basis. If there
is no discernible difference between two states, no matter how hard the subject reflects
on her current state, finding evidence which tells which state she is in, she just cannot
know her current state because there is no such evidence available for her to reflect on.
The subject can never form true beliefs about her current state on a well-justified basis
from the experiential evidence. She may happen to form a true belief about her current
state but such a belief (true by luck) does not constitute knowledge. Reflective
knowledge can help distinguish between awake states and dream states only if they do
not have identical experiential content and are not fundamentally indistinguishable.

Ichikawa (2008) thinks “rational affirmations are based on sound treatment of
available evidence”, not on guarantees of non-inaccuracy. He uses the example of safe
barn in fake barn country to illustrate that.

But in fact those experiences are not perceptual ones because of the lack of appropriate causal
relations between the inputs and the subject’s interpretation of the signals.
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“Henry is driving around in fake barn country, where most of the barn‐like things are
fake barns; he sees a bunch of things that look like barns. He picks out one barn‐like
thing, and says to himself That's a barn. The thing Henry singled out was, in fact, the
only real barn hereabouts, although it had no visible distinguishing marks. Furthermore,
the barn Henry saw was modally robust. In all the nearby possible worlds, that barn
was present (and was a barn). The people here take that barn very seriously; if it ever
fell down, the entire town would make its restoration their first priority. No one would
dream of putting a fake barn there.”

(ibid., p.524)

Ichikawa agrees with Sosa that subjective distinguishability is not symmetric: if we
can tell we are in an awake state when we are awake, it means awake states are
distinguishable from dream states. This does not cause a pressing epistemic threat.
However, Ichikawa thinks the special epistemic status of “I think. Therefore I am
awake.”, which Sosa claims to be able to dispel the epistemic threat, does not really
resolve the problem as assumed. Both Rip’s and Henry’s beliefs happen to be true by
luck. They do not constitute knowledge and do not dispel any epistemic threat brought
by the problem.

2.2 Can the denial of belief in dreams collapse A1, A2 and resolve the
phenomenological aspect of the problem?
In order to show A1 is unsound, the focus should be put on awake states but not dream
states. A negative argument of what dreams are not does not prove directly what awake
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states are. The denial of belief in dreams does not collapse A1 at all. To collapse A1,
we need to show it is possible for the subject to know she is in an awake state when
she is awake. The epistemological aspect of the problem needs to be resolved first. If
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, A1 stands. To do
this, we need to focus on objective evidences which mark the differences between
these two kinds of states plus the subject’s ability to discern those differences, unlike
unreliable introspection of whether one holds beliefs, like Sosa’s approach.79

As shown, denial of belief in dreams, which is a negative approach of showing what
dreams are not, does not collapse A1. Does such a negative approach collapse A2 and
resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem? The answer is negative,
unfortunately. As briefly mentioned, the way they distinguish between belief and
quasi-belief which involves (unreliable) subjective introspection. The subject does not
know whether she is really “believing or quasi-believing”. This is just ad hoc and does
not help resolve the problem at all. In order to show A2 is unsound, one needs to show
that the subject can know she is in a dream state when she is really in a dream state.
Sosa’s and Ichikawa’s accounts of the denial of belief in dreams do not show that and
therefore do not collapse A2. For the phenomenological aspect of the problem, they do
not address lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming at all. Therefore, this aspect
remains unresolved.

Ichikawa thinks the imagination model of dreaming, the denial of belief in particular,
leads to a new way of understanding the problem. Unlike the traditional Cartesian

Ichikawa’s account implies that the denial of belief does not resolve the epistemological aspect of
the problem. One cannot reject A1 if the epistemological aspect of the problem remains unresolved.
Therefore, Ichikawa’s account does not reject A1 either.
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skeptical worries which are based on false beliefs, 80 the consequence of the
imagination view is that even if we do not believe and therefore there is no false belief
in dreams, it does not mean we can distinguish between dream states and awake states
and the problem is still there. He holds that these two kinds of states are essentially
similar, which grounds worries that we may mistakenly confuse the two and cannot
tell which state we are in. That implies that, to Ichikawa, the denial of belief does not
resolve the problem, as opposed to Sosa’s view. However, Ichikawa (2008) says “we
do not, in typical (waking) situations, confuse the two; we do, for the most part,
manage to know which things we believe and which we imagine” (p.527). Moreover,
he draws a sharp distinction between percepts and images.81 This means he also holds
that there are essential differences between awake states and dream states. However,
he thinks those differences does not help resolve (the epistemological aspect of) the
problem. This puts the problem in an unnecessarily stronger form. The problem is
presented as awake states and dream states being fundamentally indistinguishable in
the First Meditation. The basis of the problem is the fundamentally indistinguishable
features of these two kinds of states. Descartes resolves the (epistemological aspect of
the) problem in the Sixth Meditation. The basis of the problem shifts from the features
of the states to the awareness of the subject. Ichikawa’s approach just leads us back to
the epistemological aspect of the problem and makes the problem harder to resolve.
Sosa’s account does not resolve but Ichikawa’s account even worsens the problem.

I do not think the denial of belief in dreams is an approach of value in resolving the
problem. It does not resolve any form of the problem, nor does it resolve any aspect of
the problem. Such an approach sticks to the awake-state stereotyped conception of

80
81

Sosa also thinks false beliefs are the basis of the problem.
More detail in ch. 2a.
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imaginings as being high-order (with the subject’s awareness of the imagining state)
where the subject does not believe the content of imagination to be real. This does not
help but worsens the problem, namely why the subject does not know she is in an
imagining state and tells so in non-lucid dreaming, if dream states are imagining states
where the subject is supposed not to take the content to be real. The thing that matters
is not whether we have belief or not in dreams. The thing that matters should be: if
dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable and we can tell
we are in an awake state when we are awake, then why we cannot tell we are in a
dream state in non-lucid dreaming. We should aim at providing an explanation of why
there is non-lucid dreaming and also lucid dreaming (resolving the phenomenological
aspect of the problem), as well as exploring the relations between them and in what
sense dreaming poses a lesser threat.

3. The consequence of denying belief in dreams
One problem of denying belief in dreams is that it is difficult to account for emotions
in dreams. Most of us encounter emotions in dreams. When we dream about being
chased by a lion or a monster, we feel fear. When we dream about something pleasant,
for example having a big feast, we feel delighted. When we dream about something
undesirable, for example failing an exam, we feel negative emotions like anxiety,
despair and so on. Sometimes, tears may come out when we are overcome with grief
in dreams. I have had that kind of experience personally. This is also consistent with
dream research which shows that there are emotions in dreams (Merritt et al., 1994;
St-Onge et al., 2005). If we do not believe the dream content at all, as Ichikawa and
Sosa put it, why do we have emotions in dreams? Where do those emotions come from?
Ichikawa (2009) attempts to provide two solutions. The first one is: emotions are not
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necessarily caused by beliefs. It is possible to have emotions without having beliefs
(p.118). Morreall (1993) claims that there are cases where emotions are not caused by
belief, for example, fear in lower animals and infants which does not involve any belief.

“But while fear protects us and other animals in potentially dangerous situations, it
does not require us or them to recognize danger, or even to recognize objects. Like the
automatic reflex that makes our hand snap away from the hot frying pan milliseconds
after we touch it… some fear does not involve mental representations or intentional
objects.”
(ibid., p. 361)

The examples he gives involve physiological processes (reflex action). Those are some
of the body’s defense mechanism to make the subject stay away from danger so as to
survive. It is questionable whether emotions are physiological reflex actions.82 It is
not implausible to separate emotions from those reflex actions. 83 It is questionable
whether it is emotion or the physiological reflex that protects us from physical danger.
Moreover, in the above cases, emotions, if there are any, are caused by external sensory
inputs.84 Such cases are not applicable to dreaming and do not support the claim that
emotions are not caused by belief in dreams. I can have emotions without holding a
particular belief or intention to do any action, on one condition, which is the presence
of external stimuli. The emotions in question (in dreams) are the ones that correspond
to dream content which are not caused by external sensory stimuli. If those emotions
are not caused by belief, where do they come from? Ichikawa owes us an explanation

The above quote seems to imply so.
I may feel pain and fear after those reflex actions.
84
Here I do not commit to the account that emotions are physiological reflexes. Such an account is
consistent here.
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in this respect.

The second solution Ichikawa attempts to give is to deny emotions in dreams: we do
not have emotions but quasi-emotions.85 Does that help? First, we need to look at the
distinction between emotions and quasi-emotions. 86 At the beginning of Fearing
Fictions, Walton (1978) invites us to consider whether emotional responses involved
in fiction are genuine emotions:

“Charles is watching a horror movie about a terrible green slime. He cringes in his seat
as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly over the earth destroying everything in its
path. Soon a greasy head emerges from the undulating mass, and two beady eyes roll
around, finally fixing on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new
course straight toward the viewers. Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperately at
his chair. Afterwards, still shaken, Charles confesses that he was "terrified" of the slime.
Was he?”
(p.5)

He goes on arguing that Charles is not experiencing genuine emotions:
“Charles's state is crucially different from that of a person with an ordinary case of fear.
The fact that Charles is fully aware that the slime is fictional is, I think, good reason
to deny that what he feels is fear. It seems a principle of common sense, one which
ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative, that fear must be
accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger. Charles does not
He claims we do not have emotions in dreams except quasi-emotions that we have when we engage
ourselves in fictions. In the remaining part, when I talk about quasi-emotions, I refer to Ichikawa’s sense
of using this term, that is those involved in fiction. He does not give a detailed explanation over what
distinguishes quasi-emotions from emotions.
86
I assume Ichikawa would agree with Walton on the distinction between emotions and quasi-emotions.
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believe that he is in danger; so he is not afraid.”
(ibid., p.7)

Walton does not deny the physiological responses of Charles. However, he does not
think he is experiencing genuine fear. Rather, he calls what Charles is experiencing
“quasi-fear”. Quasi-fear can be very much akin to genuine fear, in terms of
physiological responses the subject is experiencing (Walton, 1978, p.6). Walton thinks
Charles is not experiencing genuine fear because he is aware of the fictional content
he is experiencing and does not believe the green slime is real. Here belief plays a
crucial role: one is having genuine fear only if one believes one is in danger. Some
opponent defending the claim that Charles is having genuine fear may argue that
Charles does believe the green slime is real, to a certain degree. Walton (1978) replies,
“If he half believed, and were half afraid, we would expect him to have some
inclination to act on his fear in the normal ways. Even a hesitant belief, a mere
suspicion, that the slime is real would induce any normal person seriously to consider
calling the police and warning his family. Charles gives no thought whatever to such
courses of action. He is not uncertain whether the slime is real; he is perfectly sure that
it is not.”
(p.7)

From the above quotations, we can see that corresponding belief and inclination
(intention) to carry out (particular) courses of action play an essential role in deciding
whether the subject is having genuine emotions or quasi-emotions. If the subject does
not hold a corresponding belief or intention to act, she is having quasi-emotions rather
than genuine emotions. Now the question is whether dreamers are having genuine or
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quasi-emotions during dreaming. This is not obvious. As mentioned above in section
1.4 of this chapter (about moral responsibility), intention, which involves mental
content, may not be fully accessible to us. We may be mistaken about our mental
content. It is not good to use intention to judge whether dreamers are having genuine
or quasi-emotions during dreaming, due to the uncertainty of mental content.87 It is
not uncontroversial to claim that emotions experienced in dreams are quasi-emotions.
It makes sense to say lucid dreamers are having quasi-emotions during dreaming as
they are aware of the fact that they are dreaming (imagining). They do not believe the
dream content is real in dreams. 88 The case of non-lucid dreaming is more
controversial. Non-lucid dreamers are not aware of the fact that they are dreaming. It
makes sense to say they believe the dream content is real, intend to act (but fail to
manifest in behavior due to the restricted bodily condition in sleep), and are having
genuine emotions during dreaming, according to how Walton draws the distinction
between genuine emotions and quasi-emotions.

It is not clearly obvious and uncontroversial to claim emotions experienced in dreams
are quasi-emotions, as shown in the case of non-lucid dreaming. Employing the
concept of quasi-emotions does not help account for where the emotional responses
come from in non-lucid dreaming. Dreams are internally caused, so are emotional
responses in dreams. In this sense, the most probable cause of emotional responses is
belief. For the dreaming subject to have emotions in a process which is not externally
caused, the subject needs to believe the content of imagination to a certain degree. If
the subject believes the content of imagination without being aware of the fact that the
Moreover, during dreaming, the sleeping body is generally deactivated. Even if the dreaming subject
intends to act (responding to the dream content), the sleeping state of the body much restricts movement
and thus action or behavior.
88
It is questionable whether lucid dreamers intends to act or not in their dreams. It makes sense to say
the they intend to act such and such in the dream.
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content is caused by the imagination faculty, as in non-lucid dreaming, she mistakenly
takes (wholly) internally generated imaginings to be percepts and the emotions may
be stronger. If she believes the content of imagination with the awareness of the fact
that the content is caused by imagination, as in lucid dreaming, she may have weaker
emotions. The intensity of emotions may depend on the vividness of the dream in this
case.89

Beliefs and imaginings are not mutually exclusive. Lower-order imaginings may
involve false beliefs and that may help account for the strong emotional responses (not
just in dreaming but also in some awake-state lower-order imaginings such as those of
schizophrenic patients). This does not necessarily pose a great threat to the whole
knowledge system as not all beliefs are perceptual beliefs which are building blocks
of perceptual knowledge. Endorsing the imagination view of dreaming while taking
dream beliefs to be a kind of belief may help us further study the relations between
beliefs and imaginings, which may help give some insight into the study of dreaming,
imagination, and belief. If we just stick to the awake-state stereotyped conception of
belief as being perceptual and functional, we will hinder a fair study of dreaming and
a more in-depth look into belief.

4. Concluding remarks
Sosa and Ichikawa deny beliefs occur in dreams for two main reasons: a lack of a
functional role of belief in dreams and belief inconsistency between long-standing
beliefs and dream beliefs. They believe the acceptance of belief in dreams will
undermine the reliability of the whole knowledge system (about what the external

This does not mean that lucid dreamers do not need to believe the content of dreams or imaginings
in order to have emotions. The subject needs to believe what the dream look like to her.
83
89

world is like).

Ichikawa (2009) claims it has been difficult to draw an all-embracing

account of belief so as to include dream beliefs (p. 115). In awake states, belief usually
plays a functional role which enables the subject to realize more about the external
world. Because of such a functional role, perceptual beliefs, those formed by a rational
subject on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence, are usually knowledge
about the external world, if true. However, perceptual beliefs are not the only kind of
beliefs. There are beliefs which are not necessarily formed from perceptual experience
and are not building blocks of perceptual knowledge (about what the external world is
like), for example, belief in ghosts, belief involving value-laden judgment and belief
over the content of imagination. This shows that it is not the case that all beliefs are
building blocks of knowledge and have a chance of threatening the knowledge system.
Using the functional profile of perceptual belief to deny belief in dreams involves a
kind of awake-state stereotyped conception of belief and is not a fair treatment of
dreaming.

It is misguided for Ichikawa and Sosa to deny belief in dreams due to the lack of a
functional role of perceptual belief. They misconstrue dream beliefs as a pressing
epistemic threat where they interpret dream beliefs in the form of perceptual beliefs.
However, dream beliefs are not perceptual beliefs. I interpret dream beliefs in the form
of the subject believing the content of imagination, with or without the awareness of
the imagining state. If the subject is aware of the imagining state, she does not believe
the content is real but believes what the content looks like to her. If the subject is not
aware of the imagining state, she mistakenly believes the content is real. Such an
interpretation of dream belief can account for the emotional response of the dreaming
subject, with different order of awareness of the subject explaining the corresponding
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response of the dreaming subject to the dream content. In non-lucid dreaming, the
subject may have stronger emotions while in lucid dreaming, the subject may have
weaker emotions. The denial of belief cannot satisfactorily explain the emotional
response of the subject, especially in non-lucid dreaming.

Sosa and Ichikawa deny that beliefs occur in dreams for similar reasons. However,
they hold a different view on the consequence of such an approach. Sosa thinks it can
resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem while Ichikawa disagrees. To
Sosa, false beliefs are the basis of the problem. If dreams do not cause beliefs, we do
not form false beliefs and the problem is resolved. Ichikawa does not think that is
sufficient to resolve the problem, even though he agrees with Sosa that we do not form
false beliefs in dreams. To Ichikawa, dreams as products of imagination alters our
traditional understanding of the problem which assumes that false beliefs are the cause
of problem. If dreams are products of imagination, no belief results during dreaming
and the problem is supposed to be resolved. However, we may still be mistaken in
judging whether we are being awake or dreaming, given the considerably similar
experiential characters between awake states and dream states.

The denial of belief in dreams is just an ad hoc approach and does not resolve the
problem. It does not resolve any form or any aspect of the problem. Sosa is mistaken
in thinking that it can resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem and show A1
is unsound. Reflective knowledge is only possible if dream states and awake states are
not fundamentally indistinguishable. If they have identical content, knowledge is not
possible. Ichikawa thinks the denial of belief in dreams does not resolve but leads us
to revisit the problem. It is not false belief but the inability to distinguish between
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dreams states and awake states that constitutes the problem. He says he is not a sceptic
and thinks in awake states we do not confuse the two kinds of states (Ichikawa, 2008,
p. 527). Nonetheless, he does not elucidate how the problem can be resolved. The fact
that he attempts to provide solutions and the fact that he thinks the solutions cannot
resolve the problem makes the matter even more complicated. If he thinks dream states
and awake states have essentially different features and we can tell we are in an awake
state when we are actually in an awake state, that means they can be distinguished
from one another. I will attempt to delineate the details of how the problem can be
resolved in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: A Modified Version
As we have seen, (different versions of) the imagination view of dreaming fails to
resolve the problem. However, it does not mean the imagination view of dreaming
cannot resolve the problem. In this chapter, I will attempt to modify such a view to
resolve the problem.

1. Why dreams are products of imagination:
The traditional debate on the nature of dream experiences concerns whether the
dreaming process is closer to perception or imagination. Some philosophers, for
example McGinn and Ichikawa, assume a sharp distinction between perception and
imagination. In fact, studies have shown that perception and imagination share more
similarities than assumed. Objective empirical evidence shows that these two
processes involve overlapped activation areas in brain regions (Kosslyn et al., 1997).
Moreover, Nany (2010) advocates the concept of amodal perception where mental
images are used to represent the “occluded” parts of perceived object, which shows
that imagination is an important element of perception. The Perky experiment (1910)
shows the possibility of the subject mistakenly taking percepts to be imaginings. From
the above evidence, it is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between perception and
imagination. However, that does not mean we can equate these two processes. Despite
the fact that they share more similarities than normally assumed, there are some
significant differences between them which ground the claim that the dreaming
process is closer to imagination rather than perception. First, as argued in chapter 2a,
perception involves appropriate causal relations between the external environment and
the subject’s interpretation of the external inputs. In order to justify the claim that a
certain experience is a perceptual one, there is a necessary condition: there is an
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external stimulation to which the subject’s interpretation (the internal representation)
of the signal corresponds. Second, according to Gibson (1970)’s sense-organ
adjustment test, a change in sense-organ’s status yields a change in stimulation. In this
case, a change in (external) stimulation will result in a direct corresponding change in
the internal representation of the external stimulus. Due to these two criteria, dreaming
fails to fall in the scope of perceptual experience: there is no external stimulation to
which the content of dreams corresponds and therefore a change in external stimulation
does not result in a (directly) corresponding change in dream content.90

Dreams involve features of imagination: abrupt scene switches, fictional content and
possible control. Imagination seems to be the only process which fits the features of
dreams. Why not say dreaming is just a unique process that is distinct from other
mental processes? First, I think dreams are products of imagination because of the
features stated above. Second, taking dreams to be products of imagination can help
us further explore the realm of imagination, the study of which far from being
exhausted. Dreams as products of imagination also sheds light on the study of
consciousness.

2. How to resolve the problem
2.1. The epistemological aspect
In order to resolve this aspect of the problem, we need to show that dream states and
awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. To show that, we need to
delineate the essential difference(s) between these two kinds of states, plus the
subject’s ability to discern the difference and tell which state she is in when she is
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This is argued in ch. 2a.
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really in that state.

The key difference between awake states and dream states is that awake states grant
the possibility of perceptual knowledge about what the external world is like while
dream states do not grant this. Percepts are building blocks of perceptual knowledge.
The key difference between awake states and dream states in terms of the yielding of
perceptual knowledge sticks to the key difference between percepts and images. Note
that awake states are a necessary but not a sufficient condition of percepts and
perceptual knowledge. Consider the case of schizophrenic patients: when they are
overcome by the disease, they can be awake but driven by lower-order imagination
which is not a building block of knowledge. However, percepts are a sufficient
condition of awake states.91 In order to tell whether we are in an awake state, we can
test whether we are having percepts or not. The key difference between percepts and
images in terms of the yielding of perceptual knowledge adheres to the different causal
relations between inputs and the subject’s interpretation of internal representation of
the inputs. To test whether something is a percept or an image, we can use the senseorgans adjustment test. If a change in sense-organs status results in a directly
corresponding change in (external) stimulation, it is a percept and a building block of
perceptual knowledge; if a change in sense-organ status does not result in a change in
stimulation, it is an image.92 This shows that dream states and awake states are not
identical in feature.93 In awake states, we can apply this test and tell whether we are

We have to be awake in order to perceive.
The subject’s background knowledge and logical thinking skills are needed to judge whether she is
really doing the test or imagining doing the test. She needs to observe the results of the test, for example
to see whether it complies with the law of nature. It is questionable whether one can imagine everything
exactly the same as the real world, for example, imagining a corresponding change in stimulation (when
doing the test) exactly the same as that of percepts. If there is, the test may not be useful anymore, but
I personally think this is unlikely to happen, at least not generally, given the differences between
percepts and images stated throughout this thesis. In most cases, the test is still useful.
93
This means that they do not have identical experiential characters.
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in an awake state and whether what we (seem to) perceive is really a percept. This
shows that awake states and dream states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. At
least we can distinguish awake states from dream states. Then how about dream states?
Can we apply the test in dream states and tell we are in a dream state? First, during
sleep, the body is not actively receiving and interpreting external signals as the way it
does during awake states. In this sense, the body can be understood as being inactive
(in a functional sense). 94 Then it is not of much value to use the sense-organ
adjustment test in dream states, as the sense organs are not actively working. Moreover,
due to “attenuated activation” of the prefrontal cortex during rapid eye movement sleep,
the dreaming subject is deprived of the ability to think in a logical way (Voss et al.,
2013, p. 8).95 The dreaming subject may not be able to note the dream features (for
example, bizarre content and abrupt shift of scenes) and tell she is in a dream state.
That explains the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming. If a dreaming subject is able to
note the contra-reality features of dreams and tell she is in a dream state, there will be
lucid dreaming.96 This shows that it is not the content or feature of dreams that makes
one unable to tell she is in a dream state. Rather, the inability to tell one is in a dream
state is caused by the unawareness problem of the subject which may arise
independently of the dream content. I will return to this issue when I attempt to resolve
the phenomenological aspect of the problem below. The salient point here is that dream
states and awake states do not have identical experiential characters and are not
fundamentally indistinguishable. In this case, we can restore the reliability of
perceptual knowledge and no pressing epistemic threat results.

Some of the senses, for example eyes, are even closed during sleep and dream states.
The ability to think in a logical way is present in rational subjects during awake states.
96
Both lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming can have bizarre or reality-resembling content.
However, that does not mean dream states involve reality-replicating content and share identical
experiential characters with awake states.
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One may question that whether one is fundamentally unable to tell whether she is in a
dream state. The occurrence of lucid dreaming shows that this is not the case. At least
there are cases where we can tell we are in a dream state, so we are not doomed to be
unable to tell we are in a dream state when we are really so. The point is how we
become lucid in dreams and whether lucidity can be trained, which will be discussed
in section 2.3 in this chapter. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming (and also lucid
dreaming) does question the reliability of one’s access to (and also control over) one’s
mental content.

2.2. A1 & A2
A1:
Let us recall the conclusion of A1: the subject cannot know she is an awake state when
she is really so. When we grant that there are essential differences between percepts
and images, the next question is whether we can distinguish between them and tell
which state we are in. As mentioned in the previous section, we can apply the senseorgan adjustment test to distinguish between percepts and images and tell whether we
are in an awake state. Rational agents can differentiate between awake states and
dream states and tell whether they are awake or not. In this case, P1 is false and A1 is
shown to be unsound. 97 However, there is another problem. As mentioned in the
previous section, awake states are just a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
having percepts and perceptual knowledge. The cases of schizophrenic patients show
that perceptual knowledge is not guaranteed in awake states. The presence of such
irrational cases in awake states creates another problem: although there are essential
differences between percepts and images, there is nothing that can rule out the subject

Recall that P1 of A1 is: nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in a dream
state when she is actually in an awake state.
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being duped into believing she is perceiving when she is actually imagining. Even if
A1 can be shown to be unsound, awake-state lower-order imaginings (without the
subject’s awareness of the imagining state) shows the possibility of irrationality in
awake states. However, that does not pose a pressing epistemic threat. Collapsing A1
shows that perceptual knowledge is possible and the (general) reliability of perceptual
knowledge is restored. Using the cases of irrationality to deny the possibility of
perceptual knowledge puts the problem in an unnecessarily strong form. This is similar
to the dream case. Because of the lack of awake-state rationality in dreams, dreamers
usually cannot relate themselves to the dream events in an appropriate way. If this is
used to deny the possibility of dream-awareness in dreams, it puts the problem in an
unnecessarily strong form.

A2:
Let us recall the conclusion of A2: the subject cannot know she is in a dream state
when she is really so. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming shows that there is
nothing that can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in an awake state
when she is actually in a dream state.98 Even if so, the subject can know she is in a
dream state when she is really so. This can be shown by the occurrence of lucid
dreaming, which proves that P2 is false and the whole argument of A2 collapses.
2.3. The phenomenological aspect
When we resolve this aspect of the problem, we attempt to fill in the gap between nonlucid dreaming and lucid dreaming to lessen the threat posed by dreaming.

Although there are essential differences between awake states and dream states, the ability to discern
these differences and tell one is in a dream state is not present in non-lucid dreaming. Therefore, P1 of
A2 stands.
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Non-lucid dreaming is usually defined as the subject being unaware of the fact that
one is in a dream state while lucid dreaming is usually defined as the subject being
aware of the fact that one is in a dream state during dreaming. However, it is misguided
to draw a sharp distinction between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming.
According to Noreika et al. (2010), there are different degrees of lucidity in dreams:
A-lucidity, C-lucidity, B-lucidity and E-lucidity:

“A-lucidity” refers to “introspective attention directed at the construction process that
creates phenomenal representations”;
“C-lucidity” involves a stronger concept of lucidity, with “the additional capacity to
form mental concepts and engage in abstract thought”: “we are not only introspectively
aware of certain aspects of the construction process that brings the phenomenal
contents about, but can also form a mental concept of ourselves as currently
experiencing a lucid dream”;
“B-lucidity” refers to lucidity where “lucid behavior arises independently of
metacognitive insight” (dream control, also possible in non-lucid dreaming);
E-lucidity refers to lucidity where “the virtual character of the dream is available to
emotional processing”.

(pp. 40-41)

C-lucidity is said to be a minimal condition for dream lucidity. A-, B- and E-lucidity
are essential elements of full-fledged lucidity, but they are neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for one to know she is in a dream state. We can have A-lucidity
without C-lucidity or the other way round. In the former case, the subject can be said
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to be pre-lucid. Pre-lucid dreams are dreams where the subject wonders whether she
is in a dream state or becomes aware of the unreal features of dreams without coming
to the conclusion that she is in a dream state (ibid., p.40). Due to the inability of the
subject to tell she is in a dream state, pre-lucid dreamers belong to the group of nonlucid dreamers, rather than the group of lucid dreamers. Pre-lucid dreaming acts as an
important element to bridge the gap between non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming,
showing that they are gradually distinguished along a continuum rather than being
clearly distinct.

One key question is how we become lucid in dreams.99 Do lucid dreams emerge from
the very beginning of the dream? Can we become lucid in the middle of a non-lucid
dream and turn non-lucid dreams into lucid ones? Is there any relation between lucidity
and dream features? Does lucidity depend on dream features? Do we become lucid
because we attend to and reflect on the unreal features of dreams or does the awareness
of the fact that one is in a dream state come suddenly which enables us to note the
unreal features of dreams?100 If lucidity depends on dream features,101 we should be
able to tell we are in a dream state, given that there seems to be no reality-replicating
dreams. Then why do we have non-lucid dreaming? One plausible explanation is that
it is not the content of dreams which accounts for the unawareness problem in the
dream state. Then can we resolve the unawareness problem in dream states? Is it
possible that a nonlucid dreamer become lucid in the same dream? Can non-lucid
dreamers be trained to be lucid dreamers? Voss et al. (2013) summarise studies
suggesting that “lucidity only rarely arises from the recognition of bizarre elements in
That refers to lucid dreams where one knows she is in a dream state.
In the latter case, there is no need to attend to the unreal features of dreams in order to draw the
conclusion that one is in a dream state.
101
That means that we become lucid or know we are in a dream state because of the unreal features of
dreams.
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dreams” and claim their study confirms that “while lucidity involves cognitive insight
into the fact that one is dreaming, this insight is not necessarily the outcome of a
reasoning process” (p. 19). Does that mean the problem of unawareness in dream state
cannot be resolved?

2.4. Lucid dreaming is a trainable skill
According to a study conducted by Zadra et al. (1992), lucid dreaming is a learnable
skill and can be trained: non-lucid dreamers can be trained to become lucid dreamers;
lucid dreamers can be trained to enhance the frequency of the occurrence of lucid
dreams. The lucid dream induction (LDI) technique is as follows:

(1) The subject should ask himself the critical question ("am I dreaming or not'?") at
least five to ten times a day.
(2) At the same time the subject should try to imagine intensely that he is in a dream
state, that is, that everything he perceives, including his own body, is merely a dream.
(3) While asking himself the critical question the subject should concentrate not only
on contemporary occurrences, but also on events which have already taken place. Does
he come upon something unusual, or does he suffer from lapses of memory? A minute
suffices to answer the question.
(4) The subject should ask himself the critical question as a rule in all situations which
are characteristic for dreams, that is, whenever something surprising or improbable
occurs or whenever he experiences powerful emotions.
(5) It is especially helpful in learning how to dream lucidly if the subject has dreams
with a recurrent content. For example, if he frequently has feelings of fear or often sees
dogs in his dreams, then he should ask himself the critical question concerning his state
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of consciousness whenever he finds himself in threatening situations or sees a dog in
the daytime.
(6) If the subject often has dream experiences which never or rarely occur in a waking
state, such as floating or flying, then he should, while awake, try intensely to imagine
that he is having such an experience, telling himself that he is dreaming.
(7) If the subject has difficulty recalling his normal dreams, he should employ methods
for improving dream recollection such as are described in recent literature on dreaming.
In most cases, however, practice in attaining the critical-reflective frame of mind will
improve the subject's ability to recall his dreams.
(8) The subject should go to sleep thinking that he is going to attain awareness of
dreaming while in this state. Any conscious effort of will must be avoided while
thinking this thought. This method is especially effective when the subject has just
awakened in the early morning hours and has the feeling that he is about to fall asleep
again.
(9) The subject should resolve to carry out a particular action while dreaming. Simple
motions are sufficient.

(ibid., pp. 86-87)

The use of this technique further supports the claim that dream states and awake states
do not have identical content (experiential characters) and are not fundamentally
indistinguishable. Awake-state rationality (the ability to attend to the experiential
evidence to make a well-justified judgment over the state one is currently in) can be
induced into dreaming through training. 102 This paves way for resolving the

This ability is absent in non-lucid dreaming but present in full-fledged lucid dreams where there are
both A-lucidity and C-lucidity.
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unawareness problem in dream states.

The majority of lucid dreams arises from non-lucid dreams, lucid dreaming can be
thought as “fulfilling a positive function in restoring higher-order consciousness and a
stable sense of self” (Voss et al., 2013, pp. 19-20). Rational thinking which is present
in rational subjects can be restored in dreaming. We may not be able to make all dreams
lucid, but the trainability of lucid dreaming marks that the unawareness problem in
dream states is resolvable and further lessens the threat posed by (non-lucid) dreaming.

Noreika et al. (2010) summarise from several studies that “even in nonlucid dreams,
cognitive activities such as speech and thought play a more prominent role than was
previously believed” (p. 39). Thinking (reflection) is possible even in non-lucid
dreaming: non-lucid dreamers are able to “reflect upon their own actions in response
to the events occurring within the dream, but they fail to realize that these actions and
events are taking place within a dream world, rather than in the real world” (Voss et
al., 2013, p. 10); “thinking about one’s own mental states and behavior, is not
completely absent in nonlucid dreams. What is missing is only the particular type of
metacognition that allows the dreamer to realize the fact that she is dreaming rather
than awake” (Noreika et al., 2010, p. 41). If the subject is able to reflect on the relation
between the dream self and the dream world, he will realize he is dreaming and become
lucid. The trainability of lucid dreaming shows that it is possible for the dreamer to
reflect on the dream content to realize the fact that she is dreaming.

3. Dreaming and consciousness
Dreaming is thought to be a crucial example to blur the boundary between primary and
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secondary consciousness. Primary consciousness, which is often known as lower-order
consciousness, refers to the sense that the subject is restricted to “immediate scene”,
“is characterized by a fusion of past, present, and future”: “an attenuation of both longand short-term memory and an inability to engage in deliberate planning or behavioral
control” as the inability “to control and influence the ongoing experience” (Voss et al.,
2013, p. 9). Secondary (higher-order) consciousness refers to the state where the subject

can “plan ahead, reflect on his past and…contemplate his future” (ibid., p. 9).
Secondary consciousness involves “additional semantic or narrative capabilities”.
Non-lucid dreaming involves features of both primary and secondary consciousness:
the subject is restricted to the immediate dream scene and the inability to deliberately
control the content but she also engages in different thinking processes which involves
linguistic capabilities featured in secondary consciousness. Lucid dreaming also
involves both primary and secondary consciousness. It shows that dreaming is a
conscious experience and more importantly non-lucid dreaming involves some feature
of higher-order consciousness and the process is more intellectual than we assume.
This paves the way for (full-fledged) lucidity in dreams. The process of non-lucid
dreaming is thought to be more akin to primary conscious experiences while lucid
dreaming is considered as demonstrating secondary (higher-order) consciousness. It
shows that secondary consciousness is not only present in awake states. It can also be
present in dream states. More importantly, lower-order consciousness in dream states
can be transformed into higher-order one and reflective ability can be trained. This not
only provides insight for the study of consciousness but may also provide insight for
the treatment for psychotic patients who suffer from a deficient reflective ability.

4. Dreaming and psychosis
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Some scholars draw an analogy between dreaming and (waking) psychosis (Vogel,
1968; Dresler et al., 2015). One may question whether this is an appropriate analogy.
Dreaming is a commonplace daily experience. How can we be perfectly normal during
awake states and suffer from a psychosis (be mentally ill) during dream states? There
are a lot of similarities between dream states and psychotic states, for example
“implausible thought connections” and “loss of volitional control”, which suggests that
these two kinds of states may be underlain by the same mechanism (Vogel, 1968).
Recent electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data substantiate the analogy between non-lucid dreaming and psychotic state
(Dresler et al., 2015). There is a key difference between dreaming and psychosis which
results in different epistemic consequences brought by dream states and psychotic
states. First, awake states and dream states are not compatible with each other. If I am
awake, I cannot be dreaming; if I am dreaming, I cannot be awake. However, this is
not the case of psychosis. Awake states and psychotic states are compatible. I can be
awake and in a psychotic state. Psychotic states pose a greater threat than dream states
do, not to the general reliability of perceptual knowledge but to subject’s judgement
over what the external world is like and such mistaken judgment may affect the
subject’s behavior and can put the subject in danger. The subject may act according to
his imaginings without awareness of the imagining state. This may pose a threat to his
life, for example, committing suicide upon imagining a voice threatening him to die.
Such a risk is not the case of dreaming because the body of the dreaming subject is at
rest where action does not usually follow from dream content. Usually the dreaming
subject does not act according to the dream content and dreaming poses a lesser threat.
Moreover, patients in psychotic states may have difficulties socializing with others
because they are lost in their world of imagination without awareness of the imagining
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state which is reckoned as crazy by others. However, that is not the case of dreaming,
which is a mental experience. What the dreamer thinks in dreams remains in his mind
and is not manifest to others. There is no direct relationship between dreaming and
socialization.

There is one advantage of studying the relationship between dreaming and psychosis.
Some scientific research suggests that regions related to “psychotic insight deficits”
are highly activated in lucid dreaming, which “empirically substantiates the analogy
between metacognitive impairments in psychosis and non-lucid dreaming” (Dresler et
al., 2015, p. 97). This means that if lucid dreaming can be trained, it may be possible
to resolve the problem of psychosis. The LDI technique may provide some valuable
insight for the treatment of psychosis. Future study on the effectiveness of LDI
technique in curing psychotic patients can be carried out to find out detailed relations
between lucid dreaming and the curing of psychosis.

5. Concluding remarks
Empirical studies have shown that non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming fall on a
continuum rather than being clearly distinct. This shows that non-lucid dreaming is not
as pressing a challenge for the imagination view of dreaming as normally assumed.
The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming does not pose an epistemic threat that matters
to the general reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external world is like.
The possibility of transforming non-lucid dreaming into lucid dreaming further
undermines the (phenomenal) threat brought by non-lucid dreaming. This shows the
possibility of transforming lower-order consciousness into higher-order consciousness
and it may provide insight for curing psychotic patients mentally.
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CONCLUSION
Dreaming is a common daily experience. If dreams are fundamentally
indistinguishable from percepts, they will pose a great epistemic threat to the reliability
of perceptual knowledge. One cannot be sure that whether there are reality-replicating
dreams. It is unlikely to be the case, according to dream research. There are essential
differences between dream states and awake states. However, those differences are not
successfully elucidated by sticking to the awake-state stereotyped conception of
imaginings, as in McGinn’s, Ichikawa’s and Sosa’s approaches, since there is a key
difference between (non-lucid) dreams and standard awake-state imaginings: the
subject’s awareness of the actual state is present in the latter while absent in the former.
When we argue for the view that dreams are products of imagination, we should avoid
such an awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings. Rather, we should focus on
the similarities between dreams and imaginings in terms of their objective features, for
example, the possibility of involving fictional content, the possibility of a sudden shift
of scene and the possibility of control over the content without sense-organ adjustment.
These features of dreams make them belong to the realm of imagination rather than
perception. This helps avoid the pressing epistemic threat as collapsing perceptual
knowledge about the external world. We can distinguish them and tell we are in an
awake state when we are really so, using the sense-organ adjustment test. The features
of percepts are opposed to those of imaginings, for example, the impossibility of
control over the content without sense-organ adjustment, the impossibility of a sudden
shift of scene and the impossibility of involving fictional content in the contexts of real
objects. The rest to deal with is the phenomenal threat regarding the problem of
unawareness of the actual state in non-lucid dreams.
Dreams do not pose an epistemic threat like the brain-in-a-vat experiment where the
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super computer can be postulated as being able to generate imagining experiences
which are identical to perceptual experiences. In this case, perceptual imaginings (what
McGinn and Ichikawa call images) are identical to percepts and awake states and
dream states are fundamentally indistinguishable to the subject. Even if the subject is
rational and attends to the evidence available, they cannot tell they are in a virtual
reality on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence because there is no
available evidence where they can base their judgment and tell they are in a virtual
reality. If one postulates the dream phenomenon as being similar to the brain-in-a-vat
experiment, one puts forward an unnecessarily strong form of epistemic threat posed
by dreaming. There are essential differences between percepts and images (perceptual
imaginings). There are essential differences between dream states and awake states.
We can discern the difference and tell which state we are currently in. Dream states
and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. It is not an unavoidable form
of threat. The dreaming phenomenon does not pose a pressing epistemic threat to the
reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external world looks like. The
occurrence of non-lucid dreaming does pose a phenomenal threat to the reliability of
introspective knowledge, namely whether we can know we are in a dream state or not.
The occurrence of lucid dreaming shows we can know we are in a dream state. Nonlucid dreaming and lucid dreaming on a continuum and the trainability of lucid
dreaming further undermine the phenomenal threat of dreaming. The phenomenal
threat posed by dreaming may provide some insight for the study of imagination which
is far from being exhausted. It may question the reliability of introspective knowledge
not only on whether we can know we are in a dream state (imagining state) but also
on how much we can know about our (exact) mental content, if we can ever “know”
any.
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